BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR
attempted to foster with treaties and diplomacy for decades . Finally, such a
policy of nuclear first use could also cause a collapse of US domestic
support for the regional war effort that would probably rival or exceed the
antiwar activities inside the United States during the Vietnam War period .
22 . "Force XXI Operations," 2-8 .
23 . During the cold war, one fear of US strategists was the nuclear
decapitation strike from the Soviet Union, perhaps by an off-shore
sea-launched ballistic or cruise missile . See Barry R Schneider, "Invitation to a
Nuclear Beheading," Across The Board, 20, no . 7 (July/August 1983) : 9-16 .
24 . If the first engagement is decisive enough, the conflict may be over
almost before it has begun . This was true, for example, of the United
States's intervention against the Noriega regime in Panama .
25 . Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," text of remarks
by the secretary of defense to the National Press Club, November 28, 1984 .
This is included in the appendix to Weinberger's book, Fighting for Peace :
Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York : Warner Books, 1990) 441 .
26 . FM 100-5, "Appendix A : Principles of War," 176 . For a similar
commentary, see the June 1993 edition of FM 100-5, 2-4 to 2-6 .
27 . Ibid ., 174-75 .
28 . Ibid ., 175 .
29. Ibid ., 176 .
30. John A. Warden III, "Air Power for the Twenty-First Century," in Karl
P. Magyar, Editor in Chief, Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military
Security Concerns (Maxwell AFB, Alabama : Air University Press, August
1994) 328-29 .
31 . See Chester Wilmot, "David and Goliath," chapter 2, The Strugglefor
Europe (New York : Harper Colophon Books, 1952,) 33-55 . Not realizing the
potency and importance of British radar stations, the German high
command mistakenly abandoned their early bombardment of them in the
Battle of Britain because they believed that the British would be able to
repair them and put them back into operation very quickly . Had the
Germans persisted, they may have won the air battle over England .
32 . FM 100-5, 177 .
33 . In Korea, the United States was reported to have lost 35,000 troops
killed in combat ; in Vietnam the number was 53,000 ; and in World War II,
330,000 .
34 . "Force XXI Operations," 2-9 .
35 . Ibid ., 3-11 .
36 . Ibid ., 2-9 .
37 . Warden, 311-32 .
38 . Ibid ., 325 .
39 . Ibid ., 327 .
40 . Ibid .
41 . Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, "Parallel War and Hyperwar : Is Every
Want a Weakness?" See elsewhere in this volume .
42 . Gen Frederick M . Franks, Jr ., as quoted in Col Michael S . Williams
and Lt Col Herman T. Palmer, USA, "Force-Projection Logistics," Military
Review, June 1994, 29 .
43 . FM 100-5, June 1993, 3-6 .
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