BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
dominance to deter the possible Iraqi use of available BW and
CW assets . This combination might work again in the future if
the adversary is similarly outclassed in the air, and where the
preponderance of high-tech weapons is held by the allies .
Nevertheless, it is a risky strategy that might backfire with
huge downside results .
The second approach is where forces similar to those sent to
the Gulf War are given far more protection, by much improved
air defenses, missile defenses, and passive defenses . The
regional CINC would also reduce the number of lucrative
theater targets available to the enemy by an extensive
dispersal of his own forces and logistical units and by very
pronounced use of mobility to increase enemy uncertainty
concerning the location of key allied forces .
The third approach is where the main allied force stays
outside of enemy range and attempts to pick off his WMD and
destroy his massed forces by air, missile, and special forces
attacks before sending the bulk of the expeditionary force to
engage him in the endgame . In remote engagements, the allied
force would attempt to outrange the adversary and degrade his
capability before closing and attempting to finish the conflict
on allied terms .
In the future, friendly forces may be well advised to avoid,
where possible, close massed engagements with heavily armed
enemy forces . Instead, they likely should adopt the Dispersed
Storm or Remote Engagement postures as a mode of
operations out of respect for the possible consequences of an
enemy WMD strike, particularly if the adversary develops a
capability well beyond that achieved by Iraq in 1991 .
There are trade-offs in adopting the Dispersed Storm mode
of operations . On the one hand, failure to mass one's own
troops can make them more vulnerable to enemy conventional
attacks . Moreover, it would be difficult to conduct normal
conventional operations in a dispersed mode . On the other
hand, one would run less risk of having main force units
obliterated by enemy WMD strikes in this mode . The tradeoffs
of adopting the Remote Engagement mode of operations, when
facing an enemy with WMD, has received less discussion, and
deserves to be considered first .
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