BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS advanced concepts for comparable forms of mobility also could give a decisive advantage, as the Germans demonstrated in May 1940 . The Germans generated maneuver dominance on the ground by employing combined-arms units that could mass combat power quickly, supporting them with fastmoving "aerial artillery" in the form of close air support, stressing aggressiveness, developing a faster command and control system to establish C2 dominance, and employing air interdiction to degrade Allied mobility . The revolutionary period that we are currently entering will have its own forms of maneuver that will require new technologies, new operational concepts, and new organizations . Along with new forms of mobility, the United States will require advances in logistical support to maintain the effectiveness of forces engaged in dominating maneuver. The need to operate far from existing bases, with little time for logistical buildups and with insecure lines of communications, will compel changes in the supply and support of ground forces . The dangers of failure in this area are exemplified by the German campaign in the Soviet Union in 1941 . In this campaign, the Germans quickly established complete maneuver dominance over the Soviets, whose decimated air force and poorly organized ground forces could not stop the Germans' fast-moving armored columns . The Germans intended to use their maneuver dominance first to attrit the Red Army and then to seize Moscow, whose capture would sever the Soviets' transportation network and paralyze their political apparatus . Despite their maneuver dominance, the Germans failed-largely because of their logistics, which were inadequate to the needs of supporting far-flung advances over the vast distances of the Soviet Union . Future attempts at dominating maneuver may similarly come to grief as a result of shortcomings in logistics . The dual imperatives of mobility and logistics may create the need for smaller forces and new transportation technologies . The current Strategic Mobility Study has as its objective the intercontinental deployment of a heavy brigade in 15 days and a heavy corps in 75 days . In the future, the United States may require the ability to move a corps-equivalent force across the oceans in seven days or less . 87
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE This capability might be achieved through the exploitation of new transportation technology such as fast sea transports capable of 100 knots or more, the national aerospace plane, and supersonic transports ; through organizational changes creating smaller units with useful combat power that could deploy faster or be forward-deployed on naval platforms ; or through ways not yet conceived . The organization and tactics of such ground forces are difficult to visualize today . Some have suggested that twentyfirst century variants of the so-called Hutier tactic developed by the Germans in World War I-Stingray or infestation tacticswould be useful . Such tactics would combine deception and bombardment with infiltration and attacks against strong points . The ground forces may be a small number of Army infantrymen, marines, or special operations forces, delivered deep in enemy territory by air and equipped with high-technology linkages to space-based or atmospheric strike systems, in effect acting as part of a sensor-shooter network . The United States may need new technologies if it employs such tactics and seeks to maintain the lead that its forces possess in close combat . As advanced sensors and conventional weapons technologies proliferate and provide greater stand-off ranges for enemy forces, the United States should concentrate on achieving capabilities that will allow it to leap ahead of these developments . We should begin now to apply low-observability techniques to maneuver systems . We need to develop advanced propulsion technologies to give our maneuver systems greater speed, range, and agility . We also need new means to enhance the lethality of our munitions and the protective characteristics of our materials and systems . Progress in these conceptual and technological areas will enable maneuver to play a significant role in the RMA . It is possible that precision strike and information warfare will make maneuver unnecessary in certain situations or that enemy progress in these areas will make maneuver difficult . Nevertheless, maneuver will be essential against an enemy unwilling to concede defeat unless the United States defeats centers of gravity that cannot be attacked without maneuver forces . Dominating maneuver may provide the coup de grace in future wars, and in other situations may serve as the 88
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 21st Cent
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To Keegie (eSchneider) who so fully
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Battlefield of the Future 21st Cent
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Acknowledgments We, the editors, wi
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Introduction This is a book about s
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the outset of a conflict. This will
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Chapter 1 Principles of War for the
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR by the proliferat
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR should not be eng
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Some would argue
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR designed to fight
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR presenting the en
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Col John Warden,
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR allied forces in
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The enemy WMD thr
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR military operatio
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR politically in Ir
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Moreover, as Sadd
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The Principle of
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Until the NASTI r
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR S - Simultaneity
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR effective logisti
Page 46 and 47: PRINCIPLES OF WAR organizations, el
Page 48 and 49: PRINCIPLES OF WAR Notes 1 . Rogue s
Page 50 and 51: PRINCIPLES OF WAR attempted to fost
Page 52 and 53: Overview : New Era Warfare? A Revol
Page 54 and 55: NEW ERAWARFARE? Patriot, which was
Page 56 and 57: Chapter 2 New-Era Warfare Gen Charl
Page 58 and 59: NEW-ERA WARFARE many nations that a
Page 60 and 61: NEW-ERAWARFARE brilliant decision o
Page 62 and 63: NEW-ERAWARFARE The United States ca
Page 64 and 65: NEW-ERA WARFARE Terminal-phase Inte
Page 66 and 67: NEW-ERAWARFARE have to fight for th
Page 68 and 69: NEW-ERAWARFARE might retaliate with
Page 70 and 71: NEW-ERAWARFARE Our nuclear-weapons
Page 72 and 73: NEW-ERAWARFARE to our disadvantage,
Page 74 and 75: Chapter 3 The Revolution in Militar
Page 76 and 77: THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
Page 108 and 109: Overview : Future Airpower and Stra
Page 110 and 111: FUTURE AIRPOWER AND STRATEGY ISSUES
Page 112 and 113: Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty
Page 114 and 115: AIRTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTU
Page 116 and 117: AIRTHEORY FORTHETWENTY-FIRST CENTUR
Page 124 and 125: AIRTHEORY FOR THETWENTY-FIRST CENTU
Page 130 and 131: AIR THEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENT
Page 132 and 133: AIR THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN
Page 134 and 135: Chapter 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar
Page 136 and 137: PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR In this ta
Page 138 and 139: PARALLEL WAR AND HYPERWAR due to th
Page 140 and 141: PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR albeit som
Page 142 and 143: PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR are essent
Page 144 and 145: PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR The realit
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR Airpower-A
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR Defeating
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR " When att
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR SIOP, it i
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PARALLEL WAR AND HYPERWAR 11 . "Inf
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR mass in sp
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Overview : Information Warfare Issu
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INFORMATION WARFARE ISSUES per day;
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Chapter 6 Information War - Cyberwa
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INFORMATION WAR - CYBERWAR - NEIWAR
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INFORMATIONWAR - CYBERWAR - NETWAR
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INFORMATION WAR - CYBERWAR - NETWAR
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INFORMATIONWAR - CYBERWAR - NETWAR
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Chapter 7 Information Warfare : Imp
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INFORMATION WARFARE exploiting our
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INFORMATION WARFARE sufficient . He
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INFORMATION WARFARE now-whether the
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INFORMATION WARFARE it, convinced C
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INFORMATION WARFARE Jr.45 Conceived
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INFORMATIONWARFARE deception nets,
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INFORMATIONWARFARE The Joint Commun
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INFORMATION WARFARE but a limited n
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INFORMATIONWARFARE adversary . We h
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INFORMATIONWARFARE example, to stov
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INFORMATIONWARFARE Interestingly, o
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INFORMATION WARFARE avenue to emplo
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INFORMATION WARFARE 21 . Ibid ., 16
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INFORMATION WARFARE 68 . Petersen,
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Overview: Biological Warfare Issues
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BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ISSUES airliners
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Chapter 8 The Biological Weapon : A
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THEBIOLOGICAL WEAPON the terrorist
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON Biological Wa
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON Another incid
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON The defector
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON advanced prog
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON agents may al
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON higher by ord
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THE BIOLOGICAL-WEAPON terms of rapi
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THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPON they say the
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THE BIOLOGICALWEAPON 43 . "Biologic
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Chapter 9 Twenty-First Century Germ
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE u
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGERM WARFARE fo
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'TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE the grisl
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE pursue BW
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE c
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE i
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE f
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE b
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYGERM WARFARE ma
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE N
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Chapter 10 Biological Weapons for W
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FORWAGING ECONOM
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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Chapter 11 On Twenty-first Century
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warfare, space war, precision warfa
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example, where the United States as
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5,500 more . This group also had be
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About the Contributors James Blackw
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College . A retired US Navy command
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finishing a book on "Counterprolife
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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