BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
interwar period led to the development of blitzkrieg, carrier
aviation, amphibious warfare, and strategic bombing .
In some cases, the changes in technology associated with
these revolutions changed not only transportation,
communication, and warfare but also entire societies as well .
During the transportation revolution, for example, railroads
altered the economies of nations and allowed them to move
military forces farther and faster and sustained them longer .
Moreover, these societal changes created new sets of
operational and strategic targets . We currently characterize
these kinds of revolutions as "social-military revolutions ."
To date, the bulk of the intellectual and physical development
associated with the current RMA has focused on new systems
and technologies . What is needed now is a more careful
analysis of the new operational concepts and new
organizations that might best help us realize the full potential
of these new systems and technologies . To reach that level of
analysis, we need to start with an appreciation of the historical
and geostrategic contexts in which the RMA may unfold .
What motivated past changes in the conduct of warfare?
Who might our future competitors be? What will be their
political and military objectives? How might they choose to
organize and equip militarily to achieve those objectives? How
might the conduct of warfare change? The answers to these
questions will assist us in identifying new RMA warfare areas
and, in turn, help identify what new military capabilities the
United States will need .
Before proceeding, however, we must issue a word of
caution . Although we think that we now stand at the start of a
long period in which we may face a RMA, we cannot be certain
about when the transition period might start, how long it
might last, what new competitors might arise, when they will
arise, or what new warfare areas might be developed, not to
mention a host of other key questions . In short, we do not
have an absolute grasp of the scope, pace, and implications of
this possible RMA .
We can make useful observations even at this early stage .
During and immediately after the First World War,
forward-thinking military officers such as Col J.F.C . Fuller of
the British army and Maj Earl Ellis of the US Marine Corps
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