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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

Battlefield of the Future - Air University Press

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PRINCIPLES <strong>OF</strong> WAR<br />

The enemy WMD threat might even extend beyond the<br />

theater of war to the capitals of allied countries, including even<br />

Washington, D.C . It may be possible that the adversary has<br />

aircraft or missiles capable of reaching such capitals . Even if<br />

this was not technically possible, it is conceivable that<br />

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons could be delivered<br />

against such cities by unconventional means via saboteurs<br />

smuggling them in the allied countries and detonating them or<br />

threatening to do so to achieve favorable diplomatic<br />

concessions at the end of the conflict .<br />

Unfortunately, most allied capitals are highly vulnerable to<br />

WMD threats . For example, Washington, D.C ., has long been a<br />

vulnerable target and will remain so in the foreseeable<br />

future .23 A clandestine nuclear detonation in the city would<br />

likely doom the US president, the vice president, Cabinet<br />

members, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members of Congress<br />

who were there at the time . The chaos that such an attack<br />

would cause would be difficult to overstate . One of the more<br />

difficult questions to answer in the hours after such a NASTI<br />

decapitation attack would be "who is in charge here?"<br />

This chaos would be compounded if the headquarters housing<br />

the US regional CINC and his staff also were to suffer a similar<br />

decapitation strike at the same time . It is possible that the<br />

national leadership and the regional military forces of the<br />

United States would be plunged into chaos for sometime .<br />

The threat of communication disruption and command disablement<br />

in conflicts with NASTIs leads to several conclusions<br />

regarding the preservation of unity of command in such conflicts :<br />

" Command unity may have to give way to subcommand<br />

dispersal under a preset unified contingency plan ;<br />

" Military units may need to be more autonomous and<br />

dependent on prewar planning of operations ;<br />

" Unit commanders will need simpler, less frequent<br />

updates from central headquarters ;<br />

" Alternative commanders in mobile and hardened command<br />

posts will be needed for all regional and supporting<br />

CINCs, with trained backups in reserve several layers<br />

deep, ready to assume command if and when the CINCs<br />

are targeted, killed, or isolated from their forces ;<br />

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