BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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INFORMATIONWARFARE deception nets, which were known to be monitored by the Germans, to complement intrusion traffic enciphered with Enigma . Bletchley personnel could prepare the Enigma traffic and send it to the radio deception units to be transmitted verbatim on specified frequencies . The personnel employed in the radio deception were well trained for their purpose and indoctrinated in the secrecy of their work. If Churchill saw the invasion as the last big push to defeat Germany, he may also have viewed selective use of intrusion as justified and worth the risk . Given the increasing disruption that occurs with the multiplying intensity of battle, the risk would have gradually diminished with time during the course of the fight. As the risk diminished, the opportunities would have grown . Greater opportunities would have been enticing to Churchill, especially if there were opportunities to shape the postwar world . Much of the history of WWII may need to be rewritten because of the revelations of Ultra contributions . Revelations include those already made and those yet to be made . Considering what we now know about Ultra operations, one can assume that credit for success in a battle often went to the wrong party . The men and women at Bletchely Park and other locations, who were involved in providing advance warning and other information to Allied forces may never get all the credit they are due . It is now well known that "Ultra did indeed shape the character of strategy and operations-particularly operations . In no other war have commanding generals had the quality and extent of intelligence provided by Ultra ."-9 -9 Whether Churchill actually used the Enigma offensively for the purposes hypothesized here may never be known . If he did not, maybe the cause was that it was too risky, or just too tough to do . Maybe the Allies did not possess enough information on the keying cycles necessary to exploit that avenue of deception . Or maybe the Allies just missed a good opportunity . Absent further declassification, we cannot know for certain . While logic suggests Churchill would have exploited Enigma, the facts may prove otherwise . If he did use it in this manner, it would have been information warfare at its best. Perhaps it was . 183
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE Impact of Information Technology on the Gulf War Although the use and exchange of information have been critical elements of war since its inception, the Gulf War was the stage for the most comprehensive use of information, and information denial, to date . New technologies in this conflict enhanced the Coalition's ability to exchange and use information and highlighted the imperative of denying the adversary his ability to communicate with his forces . While in large part these technologies were space-dependent, recent advancements in digital technology permitted the rapid processing, transmission, and display of information at all echelons, enabling decision makers to respond rapidly to developing situations on the battlefield . Some prototype systems, such as JSTARS, successfully made their trial run during this conflict, earning their place in history as contributors to the Coalition success in this war . Architectures enabling connectivity between these many systems were nonexistent when Iraq invaded Kuwait ; however, they were put in place during the buildup and supported Coalition forces for the duration of the war . These architectures were clearly necessary to effectively control the myriad activities operating simultaneously in the battlefield . For example, 11 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft controlled 2,240 sorties a day, more than 90,000 during the war, with no midair collisions and no friendly air engagements . Satellite connectivity permitted this same air activity to be displayed live in the Pentagon command center . JSTARS tracked tanks, trucks, fixed installations, and other equipment, even though this system had not met operational capability status . Satellites, microwave, and landlines handled 700,000 phone calls and 152,000 messages a day. Coalition forces avoided communications interference through successful deconfliction of more than 35,000 frequencies . Any attempt to describe the complexities of managing this system would be an understatement . 184
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE 21st Cent
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To Keegie (eSchneider) who so fully
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Battlefield of the Future 21st Cent
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Acknowledgments We, the editors, wi
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Introduction This is a book about s
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the outset of a conflict. This will
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Chapter 1 Principles of War for the
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR by the proliferat
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR should not be eng
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Some would argue
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR designed to fight
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR presenting the en
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Col John Warden,
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR allied forces in
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The enemy WMD thr
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR military operatio
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR politically in Ir
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Moreover, as Sadd
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR The Principle of
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Until the NASTI r
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR S - Simultaneity
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR effective logisti
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR organizations, el
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR Notes 1 . Rogue s
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PRINCIPLES OF WAR attempted to fost
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Overview : New Era Warfare? A Revol
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NEW ERAWARFARE? Patriot, which was
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Chapter 2 New-Era Warfare Gen Charl
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NEW-ERA WARFARE many nations that a
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NEW-ERAWARFARE brilliant decision o
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NEW-ERAWARFARE The United States ca
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NEW-ERA WARFARE Terminal-phase Inte
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NEW-ERAWARFARE have to fight for th
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NEW-ERAWARFARE might retaliate with
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NEW-ERAWARFARE Our nuclear-weapons
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NEW-ERAWARFARE to our disadvantage,
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Chapter 3 The Revolution in Militar
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THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
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Overview : Future Airpower and Stra
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FUTURE AIRPOWER AND STRATEGY ISSUES
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Chapter 4 Air Theory for the Twenty
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AIRTHEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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AIRTHEORY FORTHETWENTY-FIRST CENTUR
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AIRTHEORY FOR THETWENTY-FIRST CENTU
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AIR THEORY FORTHE TWENTY-FIRST CENT
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AIR THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN
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Chapter 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR In this ta
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PARALLEL WAR AND HYPERWAR due to th
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PARALLEL WARAND HYPERWAR albeit som
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'TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE the grisl
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE pursue BW
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE b
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TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GERM WARFARE N
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Chapter 10 Biological Weapons for W
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FORWAGING ECONOM
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS FOR WAGING ECONO
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Chapter 11 On Twenty-first Century
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warfare, space war, precision warfa
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example, where the United States as
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5,500 more . This group also had be
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About the Contributors James Blackw
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College . A retired US Navy command
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finishing a book on "Counterprolife
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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

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