BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
Control in Historical and Psychocultural Perspective : A Preliminary Study,"
Technical Report NPS55-86-013 (Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate
School, 1986) .
42 . A theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns"
responsibility for everything that transits the air is not a warfare theory . A
theory that asserts, for example, that an air force "owns" responsibility for
the "deep battle" or the "high battle" is not a warfare theory. These are roles
and missions, or defense resource appropriation, theories . A theory, on the
other hand, hypothesizes that the battlespace is seamless .
43 . Where the maintenance and modernization of large land armies
continue to sap national investments, the required technologies are less
likely to be forthcoming . France, England, and Germany provide good
examples . The "army" structurally and financially dominates the defense
debate and budget. Thus, airpower is foredoomed to structural impotence in
France, Germany, and England .
44 . A senior Air Force officer speaking to the Air War College under the
promise of nonattribution asserted that "without technology, there is no Air
Force ." Technology is a tool, a means to an end . When it becomes an end in
itself, it may serve itself instead ofwarfare .
45 . Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome : The Role of Air Power Theory in
the Evolution and Fate of U.S . Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ . : Transaction
Publishers, 1994) .