BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE
Battlefield of the Future - Air University Press
Battlefield of the Future - Air University Press
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<strong>BATTLEFIELD</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>THE</strong> <strong>FUTURE</strong><br />
instant cumulative war, or parallel war and hyperwar, decades<br />
before current theorists articulated "the five rings ." As<br />
Desmond Ball has shown, SIOP nuclear weapons were<br />
allocated against target sets in the former Soviet system<br />
characterized as "leadership" (leadership), "nuclear force"<br />
(nuclear forces), "economic and industrial" (organic essentials<br />
and logistics infrastructure), and "other military" (other fielded<br />
forces) .<br />
17 The, SIOP also evidenced coherence and simultaneity,<br />
using Cooper's terms . Thus, there is scant difference between<br />
the targeting logic of the SIOP approach and the targeting logic<br />
of the five-rings approach, save for the important distinction<br />
that one employed nuclear weapons effects and the other did<br />
not, but might have . 18 While the difference between the<br />
nuclear SIOP and parallel war waged with conventional<br />
weapons is critically important, there are more similarities<br />
between the theories than differences . Both approaches<br />
sought to strike decisive points, both sought to checkmate<br />
enemy leadership, both were executed simultaneously and<br />
with hyper speed, 19 both aimed at driving down enemy "energy<br />
levels" dramatically, both sought to impose shock and<br />
paralysis on the enemy system, and both sought to eliminate<br />
rapid (or almost "any," in the case of the SIOP) enemy<br />
post-attack recovery capability .2° Nuclear weapons use does<br />
make a difference . The SIOP intended to be so threatening that<br />
it also may have been self-deterring . Parallel warfare using<br />
nonnuclear appears no less threatening in terms of its<br />
immediate consequences, but has fewer constraints on its<br />
employment . Even so, the difference in weapons is not a<br />
difference in the theory qua. theory nor in the proximate effects<br />
the SIOP and nonnuclear parallel war sought. 21<br />
Strengths and Shortcomings<br />
The strength of cumulative strategies, both the SIOP and<br />
parallel war, even though they are the same theory, is that<br />
they promise to reduce more rapidly the war-making capacity<br />
of an industrialized enemy state . 22 It is indisputable that<br />
industrial states may be organized as the kind of system<br />
represented . The logic of a cumulative model appears sound,<br />
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