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BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

Battlefield of the Future - Air University Press

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<strong>BATTLEFIELD</strong> <strong>OF</strong> <strong>THE</strong> <strong>FUTURE</strong><br />

country . Perhaps you would agree to a moratorium on sales .<br />

Your enemy might or might not accept these counterproposals ;<br />

it would depend largely on how much he was willing to spend<br />

to create a cost for you . In our ideal world we like to think we<br />

don't negotiate with drug dealers or tyrants like Saddam<br />

Hussein . In the real world we do so all the time . Very rarely<br />

are we willing to invest the time and effort required to achieve<br />

maximal results .<br />

Our discussion of costs has so far been oriented at a<br />

strategic level . Does it also apply at an operational level-the<br />

level at which military forces are actually employed? The<br />

answer is an absolute yes . Military commanders, with the<br />

exception of a few really stupid ones, have always weighed<br />

costs as they were planning or conducting an operation . Let's<br />

take a hypothetical look at George Patton and the Third Army<br />

in World War II .<br />

George Patton was an aggressive commander who believed<br />

that speed of advance was key to success . Obviously, then, the<br />

Third Army needed to move quickly as a system-not just the<br />

tanks, but the whole system that supported them at the front .<br />

From the German side, if moving fast was good from George<br />

Patton's perspective, it was bad from theirs . Now, let us do a<br />

quick five-ring analysis of the Third Army from just the cost<br />

standpoint . (We will return to it later when we discuss<br />

operational paralysis .)<br />

Let us suppose that something catastrophic happened to<br />

Third Army's fuel supply in mid-September of 1944 . Let us<br />

assume that someone tells General Patton at a staff meeting<br />

that all fuel deliveries to his Army will cease in two days . His<br />

choices are basically two : slow down or stop the movement of<br />

his army so that it can assume a reasonable defensive<br />

position, or tell everyone to plunge ahead as far as possible<br />

until they run out of gas . Since the latter is likely to leave the<br />

majority of the army in an untenable and unplanned position<br />

and is unlikely to achieve anything final, Patton opts for the<br />

former because he has assessed the cost of continuing as too<br />

high for the possible results .<br />

Realize also that unbeknownst to the commanding general,<br />

every subordinate commander and soldier will start acting on<br />

information about an impending fuel shortage as soon as he

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