International Handbook of Clinical Hypnosis - E-Lib FK UWKS

98 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL HYPNOSIS
1996; Pope & Brown, 1996; Schacter, 1996; Spanos, 1996; Terr, 1994; Yapko,
1994), and I focus on the reporting of recovered memories of childhood abuse by
adults who had not previously reported such memories. This type of reporting can
be argued to involve the therapeutic recovery of repressed, true memories Briere &
Conte, 1993; Courtois, 1992; Freyd, 1994; Herman & Schatzow, 1987; Olio, 1989;
Pope, 1996; Williams, 1994, 1995). This type of reporting, however, can be argued
to involve the creation of false memories Brenneis, 1994; Garry & Loftus, 1994;
Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993; Lynn & Nash, 1994; Ofshe & Singer, 1994).
As McConkey 1997; McConkey & Sheehan, 1995) pointed out, there are
dif®culties involved in achieving a balanced and practical position on the issues
associated with recovered memory of childhood abuse. Nevertheless, it is important
to work with clients in a way that is professionally defensible and therapeutically
bene®cial. To help in this, I comment on: a) memory, repression, and recovered
memory; b) hypnosis and memory; and c) guidelines for evidence-based practice.
MEMORY, REPRESSION, AND RECOVERED MEMORY
There is extensive evidence that memory is extremely susceptible to the in¯uence
of suggestion, postevent information, and source confusion Belli & Loftus, 1996;
Brainerd & Reyna, 1996; Conway, Collins, Gathercole & Anderson, 1996; Hyman
& Pentland, 1996; McDermott, 1996; Mitchell & Zaragoza, 1996; Payne, Elie,
Blackwell & Neuschatz, 1996; Read, 1996; Roediger, Jacoby & McDermott, 1996;
Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996). For instance, Zaragoza & Mitchell 1996) showed
people a video of a burglary and then asked questions containing misleading
suggestions, some of which were repeated; then, they tested memory for the source
of the suggestions. Zaragoza & Mitchell 1996) found that, in comparison to
subjects exposed to the suggestion only once, those exposed repeatedly were more
likely to con®dently remember the suggested events from the video and to claim
they could recall witnessing the suggested events.
Despite the consistency and reliability of this type of ®nding, laboratory research
has been rejected by some as irrelevant to the debate about recovered memory. For
instance, Freyd & Gleaves 1996; Kristiansen, Felton & Hovdestad, 1996; van der
Kolk, 1994; but see Roediger & McDermott, 1996) argued that laboratory research
on memories of benign, arti®cially constructed stimuli tells us nothing about
processes involved in memory for severely traumatic events. However, recognizing
that memory is malleable does not mean recovered memories of childhood abuse
are necessarily inaccurate; it simply means they are not necessarily accurate.
Whereas there is clinical observation and personal anecdote that individuals may
avoid or be unaware of threatening memories Martinez-Taboas, 1996), such
memories can be in¯uenced by various cognitive and social events Loftus, 1993).
In other words, there is no strong reason or evidence why memory for traumatic
events should follow entirely different psychological principles from those followed