International Handbook of Clinical Hypnosis - E-Lib FK UWKS

HYPNOSIS AND RECOVERED MEMORY 99
by memory for nontraumatic events Kihlstrom, 1994, 1995); equally, memory
should follow the same principles whether or not hypnosis is involved Kihlstrom
& Barnhardt, 1993). Notably though, at a biological level, the release of neural
hormones during trauma may enhance the consolidation and storage of memory for
that event Cahill, Prins, Weber & McGaugh, 1994; but see Bremner, Krystal,
Charney & Southwick, 1996). Also, the experience of trauma may be more likely
to lead to the occurrence of recurrent and intrusive memories than to the forgetting
of that experience Frankel, 1994; LeDoux, 1991; LeDoux, Romanski & Zagoraris,
1989).
Discussion about the recovery of memory for traumatic events typically shows
various views about repression McConkey, 1997). In general, repression can be
said to involve the motivated forgetting of information that is threatening to the
self. Repression and related constructs such as dissociation, however, have been
conceptualized in a variety of ways and that variation is one of the problems of the
debate on recovered memory Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984; Lynn & Rhue, 1994;
Singer, 1990; Spiegel, 1994). Notably, analyses of the original concept of repression
in the writings of Freud have highlighted its internal inconsistencies and its
limited value beyond a very general description of assumed processes Holmes,
1974, 1990; Macmillan, 1997; for a summary of empirical work, see Pope &
Hudson, 1995). The relative impreciseness of the concept of repression and the
dif®culty of testing it led Holmes 1990) to say that `despite over sixty years of
research ... there is no controlled laboratory evidence supporting the concept of
repression' p. 96). Further, he suggested that those who use the notion should
warn that `the concept of repression has not been validated with experimental
research and its use may be hazardous to the accurate interpretation of clinical
behavior' Holmes, 1990, p. 97). Notwithstanding this view, clinical observation
suggests that thoughts about and memories of important personal events can be set
aside from normal awareness, and concepts such as repression or dissociation may
be of heuristic value in helping to understand that process Bower, 1990; Davis,
1990; Erdelyi, 1993; Nemiah, 1984; Weinberger, 1990). Although such concepts
may have some value, this does not mean that if `repressed' or `dissociated'
thoughts and memories are reported, then they are necessarily accurate representations.
That is, accepting a notion of repression does not necessarily mean that
recovered memories are historically accurate. Even if a memory has been forgotten
for a time, this does not mean that it is not in¯uenced by the constructive and
reconstructive features of memories in general Bowers & Farvolden, 1996).
We should not assume that freshly reported material indicates the lifting of
repression that is linked to traumas of childhood. Rather, the fact that people
sometimes remember events they had forgotten does not mean those events were
traumatic, nor does it mean those particular memories were repressed. In other
words, much of the nonreporting of such events may occur because of normal
forgetting, embarrassment over reporting the events, the consequences of reporting
the events, or various other reasons that relate to factors other than repression. In