International Handbook of Clinical Hypnosis - E-Lib FK UWKS

100 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL HYPNOSIS
this respect, it does not seem to be possible to distinguish between people who do
not report abuse and those who do not remember it; among the latter, it does not
seem possible to distinguish forgetting that re¯ects repression, dissociation, other
pathological processes, and benign processes Kihlstrom, 1995). Nevertheless,
when clinicians are faced with clients who experience themselves remembering a
previously forgotten trauma, they must recognize the clinical relevance of this;
equally, however, clinicians need to recognize that memories are affected by factors
like suggestion, transference, personal values, social interactions, and fantasies
associated with the event and its remembering Nash, 1994).
Whatever their nature, it is clear that memories and the meaning placed on them
change during therapy in various ways. For instance, Foa, Molnar, and Cashman
1995) examined the memory reports of female rape victims during therapy, and
found that their length increased across treatment, the percentage of reported
actions and dialogue decreased, and the percentage of thoughts and feelings
increased. There was an increase in the number of thoughts that attempted to
structure the memory of rape. Thus, their narratives changed with the imaginal
reliving of the trauma, and the victims tried to restructure their memory to provide
a sense of coherence. That coherence may give a strong feeling of narrative truth
and may feel right for both the client and the clinician, but it may not be an
indication of the historical truth of the event. The fact that narrative and historical
truth Spence, 1982, 1994) may not coincide is nonproblematic and manageable by
clinicians with relevant knowledge and skill. However, it may be problematic in
nonclinical settings, such as the courtroom, in which the processes, goals, and
demands are very different from the clinical setting. As Spiegel & Sche¯in 1994)
noted, it is possible to convince oneself of a false belief, and memory alone cannot
be trusted in the absence of independent corroboration.
Questions about the trust that can be placed in recovered memory and the utility
of such memory in clinical and court settings have led to research on whether
memories of childhood abuse can be recovered. While recognizing that childhood
sexual abuse can cause signi®cant physical and emotional harm Janoff-Bulman,
1992; Kendall-Tacket, Williams & Finkelhor, 1993; Nash, Hulsey, Sexton, Harralson
& Lambert, 1993; Romans, Martin, Anderson, O'Shea & Mullen, 1995),
recovered memories of abuse cannot be seen as self-validating. Rather, the nature
and accuracy of memories recovered during therapy need to be determined
independently instead of being assumed by the client, the clinician, or others; this
is especially the case when dealing with those therapies that may strongly bias the
creation of illusory memories Lindsay & Read, 1994). As Bowers & Farvolden
1996) noted, however, the situation becomes complicated if clinicians accept abuse
memories at face value; sometimes clinicians do this because they feel they must
serve the client by con®rming each of his or her ideas, memories, and beliefs. This
tendency by some clinicians is unfortunate not only because it may lead clients to
assume the validity of memories that may not be accurate, but also because it
conveys that the clinician knows the truth about the client. As Bowers & Farvolden