U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide ... - USITC

party and the public and to be responsible for, inter alia, the review of communications from
persons of a party. A side letter clarifies that the parties would not be required to establish
discrete procedures for the review of such communications if there are existing procedures
for other communications relating to chapter 19, and that parties could consider whether a
particular communication has merit, substantively resembles another communication, or is
being addressed in another domestic or international forum. The FTA would allow each
party to call together a national labor advisory committee, which may include representatives
of business and labor, members of the public, and others. Annex 19-A would also create a
Labor Cooperation Mechanism to further advance common commitments on labor matters,
including the ILO Declaration, and to enhance opportunities to improve labor standards.
Under Article 19.7, a party could request consultations with the other party on matters under
this chapter with a view toward finding a mutually acceptable resolution. Failing to find a
mutually acceptable resolution, a party could call upon the Labor Affairs Council to consider
the matter. If a matter is not resolved within 60 days of a request for labor consultations, the
complaining party could ask for consultations or refer the issue to the Joint Committee under
the provisions established in Articles 22.7 and 2.8 of the FTA, following which, the party
could seek to settle the dispute under the other provisions included in chapter 22 of the
agreement.
Views of Interested Parties
U.S. advisory groups differ in their views on the potential effect of the proposed FTA labor
provisions and on whether the FTA meets the statutory negotiating objectives. The report
of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) provides a positive
view of these provisions, stating that the FTA fulfills U.S. negotiating objectives on labor
issues and enhances guarantees regarding due process and transparency. The report stated
that ACTPN supports the agreement’s cooperative approach to labor issues. 128
By contrast, the report of the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade
Policy (LAC) report states that the agreement does not fulfill U.S. negotiating objectives,
advance U.S. economic interests, or protect the rights of U.S. or Korean workers. The report
states that weaknesses exist in Korea’s workers’ rights regime (see box 6.3), and that the
agreement does not obligate parties to adhere to international workers’ rights standards, does
not preclude the weakening or elimination of labor regulations, and does not protect workers
from the possible trade effects of provisions regarding safeguards and rules of origin. 129 At
the Commission’s hearing, prior to the finalized labor provisions, a representative of the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America also expressed dissatisfaction with the agreement’s labor provisions, and
indicated that these provisions should be accorded status equal to that of other FTA
provisions. 130
128 ACTPN, Report, April 26, 2007, 9.
129 LAC for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy, Report, April 27, 2007, 3 and 9.
130 Meyer, testimony before the USITC, June 20, 2007, 221.
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