U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide ... - USITC
U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide ... - USITC
U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide ... - USITC
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7-3<br />
Table 7.1 Model, liberalization experiment, and aggregate results: Selected economic literature on a U.S.-<strong>Korea</strong> FTA<br />
Author, year Model a<br />
Database, Type of liberalization experiment<br />
base year<br />
b<br />
Change in welfare Change in U.S. Change in U.S.<br />
(percent of GDP) exports to <strong>Korea</strong> imports from <strong>Korea</strong><br />
(percent)<br />
(percent)<br />
<strong>USITC</strong>, 2001 GTAP GTAP-4, 1995 All tariffs 0.23 c<br />
54.0 21.4<br />
Choi and GTAP GTAP-4, 1995 All tariffs 0.13 49.4 30.3<br />
Schott, 2001<br />
Only manufacturing tariffs 0.06 25.5 23.3<br />
DeRosa and<br />
Gilbert, 2004<br />
GTAP GTAP-5, 1997 All tariffs 0.03 48.2 23.4<br />
Lee and Lee, GTAP GTAP-6, 2001 80% agricultural tariffs,<br />
—<br />
2005<br />
100% manufacturing tariffs, and<br />
50% service barriers<br />
e<br />
4.1 f<br />
4.5 f<br />
Zhuang and GTAP GTAP-6, 2001 50% food and agriculture tariffs,<br />
0.24 33.5 21.2<br />
Koo, 2006<br />
100% manufacturing tariffs, and<br />
hi-tech productivity increase<br />
Schott, Harrison, GTAP-6, 2001 All tariffs 0.07 —<br />
Bradford, and Rutherford,<br />
Moll, 2006 and Tarr<br />
e<br />
— e<br />
All tariffs except rice 0.10 — e<br />
— e<br />
Kiyota and Michigan GTAP-6, 2020 All tariffs and service barriers<br />
Stern, 2007<br />
d<br />
0.14 31.3 18.4<br />
Only agricultural tariffs and export subsidies d<br />
-0.01 — e<br />
— e<br />
Only manufacturing tariffs d<br />
0.04 — e<br />
— e<br />
Only service barriers d<br />
0.11 — e<br />
— e<br />
<strong>USITC</strong>, 2007 GTAP GTAP-6, 2008 All tariffs and TRQs in negotiated FTA 0.01–0.02 22.6–25.3 9.9–10.6<br />
Sources: <strong>USITC</strong>, U.S.-<strong>Korea</strong> FTA: The Economic Impact of Establishing a <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreement</strong> (FTA) Between the United States and the Republic of <strong>Korea</strong>,<br />
2001; Choi and Schott, “<strong>Korea</strong>-U.S. <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> Revisited.” In <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreement</strong>s: U.S. Strategies and Priorities, 2004; DeRosa and Gilbert, “Technical<br />
Appendix,” 2004, 383–417; Lee and Lee, “Feasibility and Economic Effects of a <strong>Korea</strong>-U.S. FTA,” December 30, 2005; Zhuang and Koo, “Implications of the<br />
<strong>Korea</strong>-U.S. <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreement</strong>,” 2006; Schott, Bradford, and Moll, “Negotiating the <strong>Korea</strong>-United States <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreement</strong>,” June 2006; and Kiyota and<br />
Stern, “Economic Effects of a <strong>Korea</strong>-U.S. <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Trade</strong> <strong>Agreement</strong>,” 2007.<br />
a<br />
The GTAP model employs Armington differentiation and assumes constant returns to scale and perfect competition in all sectors. With Armington<br />
differentiation, domestic imports compete against aggregate imports. In the Michigan model, imports from specific countries compete more directly with U.S.<br />
products. The Michigan model assumes constant returns and perfect competition in agriculture, but increasing returns and monopolistic competition in all other<br />
sectors. The Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr model employs Armington differentiation. It is capable of employing increasing returns, but Schott, Bradford, and<br />
Moll imposed constant returns and perfect competition in all sectors.<br />
b<br />
All simulations are static in nature. <strong>USITC</strong> is a static simulation that compares changes in two projected future periods. Choi and Schott and Schott,<br />
Bradford, and Moll report long-run static simulations, in which capital stock may change.<br />
c<br />
<strong>USITC</strong> reported the change in GDP rather than welfare.<br />
d<br />
Assumes Doha Round tariff reductions have been implemented prior to U.S.-<strong>Korea</strong> FTA implementation.<br />
e<br />
Not reported.<br />
f<br />
<strong>Trade</strong> increases based on increased manufacturing trade as a share of total trade; agriculture and services increases not reported.