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Khawaja Zaheer Ahmed - PDMA

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SECTION-3<br />

A SCENARIO AVERTED BY DESIGN<br />

41. As noted above also, during first peak, on 30 th July 2010, Tarbela<br />

reservoir received 835,000 cusecs, and its management decided to release only<br />

603,000 cusecs after addition of 6.97 feet against 1 foot permissible SOP at that<br />

point in time. Likewise, Mangla reservoir on Jhelum River absorbed a peak of<br />

344,000 cusecs. These two reservoirs, with a total storage capacity of 12.62<br />

MAF, are normally augmented in stages as per precisely calibrated heights /<br />

volumes as a standard practice. However, the top management engaged itself to<br />

permit substantial deviations to curtail the exceptional build up downstream<br />

Khairabad. Likewise, at Chashma carefully crafted diversions eased the pressure<br />

on the main barrage and delayed the arrivals downstream to some extent. These<br />

eventually helped reduce significantly the combined flood peaks in Indus,<br />

particularly downstream Punjnad that could have been compounded by<br />

conditions unfolding in Indian regulated river catchments. Taking into account the<br />

capacity of existing canal network, it is estimated that in the absence of<br />

absorption at Tarbela reservoir, another 232, 000 cusecs would have joined<br />

481,000 cusecs from Kabul River’s peak to swell the flows at Jinnah Barrage to a<br />

total of 1.3 million cusecs against its designed capacity of 950, 000 cusecs.<br />

42. Similarly water at Chashma and Taunsa barages, even with no addition<br />

from hill torrents/ rains on the way, would have risen to 1.4-1.5 million cusecs<br />

whereas dispatch of 1.8 million cusecs would have reached Guddu, and<br />

marginally lower 1.6 million cusecs at Sukkur on way to Kotri.<br />

43. In the light of what happened in the country during 29 th July through 27 th<br />

August 2010, it is not necessary to map the rest of the consequences for the<br />

entire Indus basin, its irrigated agriculture, the population settlements and rest of<br />

the transport and other physical infrastructure with which designers of the<br />

barrages were aware even in 1930s, when Indus Treaty replacement works like<br />

Tarbela and Mangla, were not even in contemplation. It was flagged in various<br />

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