Khawaja Zaheer Ahmed - PDMA

CHAPTER-6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
67. The adumbration of the above evidence, the information and the
Commission’s field visits when related to the relevant official instructions and
observed practices established that:-
a. The NDMA’s lead role in coordination of rescue and relief phases
during and after the floods to save life, if not the property, was
outstanding, by any standard. But it did not put in position pre-
disaster structural framework or administrative network mandated
in 2006 or contemplated by the NDMA Ordinance 2007 (LIII of
2007) or 2009 Ordinance, despite passage of over 42 months till
June 2010 or later to-date.
b. The PMD’s rain forecasts were timely but its estimations regarding
flood discharges were not as accurate as it was generally
perceived; the FFD needed to factor in the flows from hill torrents
and along other rivers where no gauges are installed; the need to
boost its capacity to forecast beyond 4-days advance warning as
compared to 10-days international best was also established;
during flood season 2010, its 28 th June assessment was off the
mark within 3-weeks. More than that, scientific simulations and
weather modelling approach by highly qualified mathematical
models could also generate better outcomes. The PMD should not
have ignored international assessments except at a great peril,
even if these did not conform to its wildest estimations, knowing in-
house technical capacity constraints.
c. The KP did not have the occasion or adequate time to plan or act
against flash floods, but in terms of response time and actions, it
acted fast to restore the damaged irrigation supplies through make-
shift arrangements that enabled most farmers to plant a bumper
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