Khawaja Zaheer Ahmed - PDMA

for a reasonable forecast, adjusted immediately for an abnormal
change in natural elements.
f. Coordination with the managements of upstream controlled
structures.
g. Pre-designated bund sections, upstream Jinnah Barrage in the
Punjab, earmarked for dismantling by use of explosives, kept handy
by Pakistan Army Engineers, should the inflow create an
extraordinary situation beyond the optimum design discharge
capacity.
45. Admittedly, the 2010 Flood was classified as super flood; the flows were
unprecedented in the KP and had generated higher than the regulation-discharge
or designed capacities, at Tarbela dam and Jinnah, Chashma & Taunsa
barrages in the Punjab, but these were not higher than previously recorded flows
in three barrages in Sindh, as reflected in the table in para 22 supra. The above
has implications:
a. The KP administration had no time to respond to flash floods that
swept away everything in Swat and Kabul rivers in a flash.
b. The three barrages in Sindh received below historic maximum
inflows, though these lasted for longer durations.
c. Tarbela Dam and Chashma barrages regulated their intakes and
outflows as per SOPs.
d. The RGB upstream Jinnah barrage was breached after interagency
consultations on 30 July 2010, for safety of the barrage as
breaches in LGB and LMB on 29 th July, 2010 a day earlier did not
warrant any risk.
e. Four major and scores of minor breaches in secondary bunds in
the Punjab, including the LGB/LMB at Jinnah and LMB at Taunsa
were not pre-designated. Inter-play of many factors contributed to
these breaches: Non–observance of Regulations, misjudgements,
delayed repairs of essential works, inefficiency of the Engineers in-
Page 110 of 211