VOL. IV (XXI) 2009 - Departamentul de Filosofie si Stiinte ale ...
VOL. IV (XXI) 2009 - Departamentul de Filosofie si Stiinte ale ...
VOL. IV (XXI) 2009 - Departamentul de Filosofie si Stiinte ale ...
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ADRIAN PĂCURAR 111<br />
One of 18 Ohio class nuclear submarines from the United States Navy<br />
submarine <strong>de</strong>terrence fleet<br />
On the other hand, following this strictly military perspective, it is also<br />
clear why those military exercises were closely watched by NATO. Of<br />
course, we will never see a high ranking NATO official saying on televi<strong>si</strong>on<br />
that the alliance is closely monitoring any Rus<strong>si</strong>an military exercise. It would<br />
be completely absurd to expect this kind of po<strong>si</strong>tion from any NATO high<br />
official. But also it would be totally unrealistic for a military analyst to believe<br />
the other way. Any Rus<strong>si</strong>an <strong>si</strong>gnificant military exercise is strictly watched, by<br />
any mean pos<strong>si</strong>ble, not only by NATO but by any serious military and<br />
political power on the planet which has the interest in doing this. It is just the<br />
pure logic of military warfare and it is nothing special in doing this. The<br />
reason because western nations could not ignore Rus<strong>si</strong>ans maneuvers in the<br />
Barents Sea during the summer of 2000 was very <strong>si</strong>mple: NATO had in that<br />
summer for the first time after the collapse of USSR the chance to see at first<br />
hand a Rus<strong>si</strong>an naval application at large sc<strong>ale</strong>. And the opportunity to see<br />
the condition of Rus<strong>si</strong>an naval tactics and equipment after all those years of<br />
inactivity could not be missed by NATO and especially by the United States.<br />
For the first time in years Rus<strong>si</strong>a has commis<strong>si</strong>oned at sea, in a major<br />
integrated naval application, its highly capable Oscar II class nuclear<br />
submarine. This is why it is so hard to believe that the Occi<strong>de</strong>nt was suffered<br />
in those days by some “lack of information” about it. Even more, it is<br />
completely realistic to assume that western governments knew much more<br />
than the general opinion was tempted to believe and it is very pos<strong>si</strong>ble that<br />
even now many <strong>de</strong>tails are still highly clas<strong>si</strong>fied and secured in SCIF areas.