VOL. IV (XXI) 2009 - Departamentul de Filosofie si Stiinte ale ...

64 “FICTION” AND “MODEL” IN SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
In the following survey two distinct modalities of legitimating the role of
the imaginary in the scientific knowledge- the one sustained by Hans
Vaihinger and the one that belongs to Max Black and Mary B.Hesse- are
submitted to critical approach, in order to highlight certain theoretical
similarities, essential to contemporary epistemology.
I. Obviously, H. Vaihinger has produced one of the first attempts at
systematic approach of the role of the Imaginary in the scientific knowledge.
His work Philosophie des Als Ob (1911, translated into English as The
Philosophy of As If, 1924) is usually appreciated as playing an important part
in the contemporary epistemology’s endeavors 2 to recover the scientific
imaginary.
The imaginary or fictional aspect of scientific knowledge is approach by
the German philosopher from the point of view of mental structures as being
a product of the logical functions, an aspect of the “reasoning capacities” 3
and not a product of intuition as one may be tempted to believe. Since the
concept of model was not broadly used in contemporary science, Vaihinger
named models “schematic fictions”. He distinguishes two types of imaginary
constructs: “half-fictions” and “authentic fictions”. The first type of fictions
oppose/contradict given reality without contradicting themselves (for instance
the artificial categories) and in this case we speak only of a “material
deviation” whereas the “authentic fictions” are contradictory in relation with
reality as well as with themselves, to the extent where they do not
correspond to the logical principles of identity and contradiction (for instance,
the concept of atom). Stating that cognitive processes and constructs must
be considered from the point of view of their intentional function, the author
will arrive at proclaiming the pragmatic status of fictions.
Scientific fictions assume this aspect because their use is almost each
and every time doubled by the certainty of the fact that fictional idea, fictional
presupposition “is not really valid” 4 .
Vaihinger insists on that the object of the scientific endeavor is to build
up ideas which respond to the types of scientific reality hence eliminating any
2
Recent authors have been exploring the implications of Vaihinger's philosophy on
fiction: Wolfgang Iser, The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan, Joseph
Conrad and the Modern Temper (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991);
Jaqueline Vaught Brogan, A Theory of Language (Princeton University Press, 1986);
Adena Rosmarin, The Power of Genre (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1985). One of the most interesting applications of Vaihinger’s concepts is most
certainly that presented within the work of the American psychologist James Hillman
– Healing Fiction (1994) – where the author state that in the description of certain
psychological conditions (neurosis and madness for instance) fictional constructs are
used (psychological fiction) which represent literalization tendencies rather than “see
through our meanings” (HF, p. 110)
3
Vaihinger, H., Filozofia lui „Ca şi cum”, Bucureşti, Editura Nemira, 2001, p.60
4
Ibidem, p.148