VOL. IV (XXI) 2009 - Departamentul de Filosofie si Stiinte ale ...

FLORIN LOBONŢ 38
Cultivating Itself” (1927), and Faith and Reason (1928), and continuing with
“The Nature of the Metaphysical Study” (1934), “The Function of
Metaphysics in Civilization” (1937-38), and concluding with An
Autobiography (1939), and An Essay on Metaphysics (1940), where he
argues—firstly in general, and then by exemplifying and identifying the
claimed aspects—that science as knowledge of the parts is grounded on a
priori principles, that is, on presuppositions which implicitly assume the unity
of the world (and hence, of the mind).
In a number of Kantian writings, metaphysics seems to be identified by
Kant with criticism itself; and the defending of the latter against the Wolffians’
attacks and against the distortions made by Kant’s own disciples becomes,
during his final creative period, his main preoccupation on which, he
believed, even the destiny of metaphysics depended. This idea essentially
converges with Collingwood’s assertion that philosophy is not only the critical
attitude in general, but criticism specifically directed inward; self-criticism is
the mark of rationality. “It is true”, the English philosopher writes, “that
philosophy does not arise in vacuo: but its relation to its presuppositions is
not dogmatic, but critical.” 17
As Colţescu suggestively points out, the Kantian equation of
metaphysics with criticism might be puzzling and could determine one to
suspect that the end is illegitimately identified with the means. Yet, only this
context permits the real understanding of the value and significance of one of
the most interesting—but also controversial—interpretations of Kantian
philosophy of this century, namely Heidegger’s, made in his famous book
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. 18 According to Heidegger, the Critique
of Pure Reason truly proposes a new metaphysics. This novelty is radical
and consists in the re-orientation of metaphysics from the transcendent
towards the transcendental. This re-orientation of philosophical research
could, as often happens, be interpreted as an abandonment of metaphysics
in favor of the theory of knowledge. Such an understanding is only possible if
we preserve the old concept of metaphysics and do not take the change
Kant has introduced in this very concept into account. According to
Heidegger, the Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with the theory of
knowledge. 19 It represents a grounding of metaphysics (Grundlegung der
Metaphysik) and has as its centre the establishment of the possibility of
ontology. Thus, the significance of Kant’s a priori theory is changed by the
modern interpreter. According to Heidegger’s interpretation, the a priori forms
of human mind make up a type of knowledge which precedes, conditions,
and orientates the empirical knowledge of things. If we call the second form
of cognitive modality—whether achieved by science or by common
knowledge—ontic knowledge, then the first form of knowledge has to be
called ontological knowledge because it aims at establishing the general
structure of being, which is the only structure whose background makes the
objects accessible to experience. Obviously, the explicit distinction between
ontic and ontological, between being and existent is Heideggerian, not