I Chose Liberty - Ludwig von Mises Institute

72 I Chose Liberty: Autobiographies of Contemporary Libertarians
is always a choice between exactly two alternatives, whereas the “object-choice” may be
between two plus items.
How does coercion come in? Consider two types of cases. Case A: a robber armed with
a pistol confronts me with, “Your money or your life!” If I perceive the threat as a credible
threat, if I feel threatened, then I conclude that ignoring the meta-choice, I may run the
risk of being shot at (the risk of incurring costs in my private sphere, in this case physical
harm). The situation is a clear case of COERCION. The distinction of meta-levels enables
us to avoid circularity: if we defined “freedom” as the absence of coercion and stipulated
(as we often do in everyday speech) that if the actor does voluntarily what the other party
“asks” him, beseeches him, urges him, etc., to do, then the definition would be circular.
That the credibility of the threat (as perceived by the actor) is essential we recognize if we
consider a type-case B. Case B: the individual confronting the actor with “life or money”
is obviously incapable of posing a serious physical threat (e.g., a child with a toy pistol). B
is clearly not a case of coercion. The individual approaching the actor offers him a free
choice: whether or not he donates some money to the other party.
To summarize, the difference between a case of coercion and a case of free choice (as
exemplified by Cases A and B above) is in the artificial costs to be expected in case of a
negative meta-decision (when ignoring the choice imposed upon the actor).
All this sounds very technical. In fact, it is. Usually, I make myself better understood
by quoting Marlon Brando, who, as the Godfather, mentioned that he was going to make
someone an “offer he can’t refuse.” In other words, refusing the offer would be too costly
for that person. This is exactly the type of costs I have in mind when talking of the costs
of a negative decision at the meta-level in the case of coercion.
Again, via Radnitzky, I became familiar with the anarcho-capitalist position of
Murray Rothbard and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. It was through Rothbard that I began to
understand that the distinction between spontaneous and constructive orders, as stressed
by Hayek, was less important than the distinction between free and coercive orders. And
what I liked most in Hoppe was the explicit attempt to develop a fully coherent, libertarian
position.
Of course, the man who influenced Hayek, Rothbard, and Hoppe most had a big
impact on me too: Ludwig von Mises. I was and am still fascinated by his crystal-clear style.
Think for instance of his magnificent way to explain why interventionism does not work.
He needed only a couple of pages in Liberalism, and nobody after him ever expressed it
better or clearer. Also, the two insights that (a) liberalism was always in favour of everybody
and never favoured a distinct group, and (b) liberalism is opposed to both conservatism
and socialism, will always remain associated with his name, for me.
In Germany, this view is still “unorthodox,” to say the least. Even historians, who
should know better, usually view conservatism and socialism as the two big antagonists
and think that liberalism belongs to either of them. Consequently, they interpret economy
as a threat to liberty and democracy as its defender, rather than vice versa. Hence, it comes
as no surprise that the best history on German liberalism was not written by a native, but
by Ralph Raico, whose book Die Partei der Freiheit is unique. When he worked on his
book, his colleagues usually teased him by asking, “Why are going to write the shortest