High Performance Microchip Supply - Under Secretary of Defense ...

__________________________________________________________________ FINDINGS
problem. Commercial facilities lack the unique processes required to
meet DOD-unique needs.
The DOD Radiation-Hardened IC Production Program is a useful
first step in meeting DOD special needs; however, challenges remain
in keeping the dedicated fabrication facilities supported under this
program up-to-date as commercial processes advance.
ADVERSARIAL CLANDESTINE OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
Because of the U.S. military dependence on advanced
technologies whose provenance is progressively more offshore,
opportunities for an adversary to clandestinely manipulate
technology used in U.S. critical microelectronics applications are
enormous and increasing. In general, a sophisticated clandestine
service will develop opportunities to gain close access to a target
technology throughout its lifetime. If access is early in a product’s
life cycle, such as in the design phase, the adversary has the option of
affecting every unit produced. More narrowly focused targeting can
be accomplished later in the life-cycle. An example of a surgical
operational approach was effectively used by the Soviets in the early
1980s by intercepting typewriters destined for the U.S. embassy in
Moscow and making a clandestine modification. This modification
allowed the Soviets to secretly obtain copies of every document typed
on the altered typewriters. 32
Increasingly, as microelectronic component product design and
production move out of direct United States control, adversaries are
able to acquire life-cycle operational access to U.S. key hardware
technologies. In many cases, DOD program managers and U.S.
industry inadvertently provide access to potential enemies as a result
of their attempts to cut costs, manage schedules, and provide state-ofthe-art
technology by moving critical design and production steps
offshore. Unfortunately, this strategy provides opportunities to
deeply embed subversive constructs into these components and
systems that could compromise the security requirements of critical
32. Presentation to the Defense Science Board Task Force on High-performance
Microelectronics by a DOD representative, May 20, 2004.
HIGH PERFORMANCE MICROCHIP SUPPLY ___________________________________________
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