High Performance Microchip Supply - Under Secretary of Defense ...

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TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ ii Recommendation 3 – Understand the Trusted Microelectronics Need – Enumeration..................................... 62 Recommendation 4 – Develop a DOD Microelectronics Action Plan ................................................................................... 63 Recommendation 5 – Develop Business Models, Technology, and Equipment for Economic Development and Production of Low-Volume ASICs........... 71 Recommendation 6 – Strengthen Bilateral and Multilateral Controls on Critical Semiconductor Manufacturing and Design Equipment ................................... 72 Recommendation 7 – Sustain Leadership in “Standard” Programmable Microchips......................................................... 73 Recommendation 8 – Support DOD-Unique Technology Research and Development ....................................................... 75 Recommendation 9 – Enhance U.S. Countertamper Proficiency .................................................................................... 77 APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE.......................................................................81 APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP................................................................83 APPENDIX C. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO ........................................85 APPENDIX D. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT...........................................87 APPENDIX E. VERIFYING CHIPS MADE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ................93 APPENDIX F. TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM .........................................................95 APPENDIX G. COMPARISON OF ASIC AND FPGA SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS...99 APPENDIX H. DFAR SUPPLEMENT .......................................................................101 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement................ 101 APPENDIX I. MINORITY REPORT............................................................................103 APPENDIX J. ACRONYMS........................................................................................105 _________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE ON
__________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The microelectronics industry, supplier of hardware capability that underlies much of America’s modern military leadership technology, is well into a profound restructuring leading to horizontal consolidation replacing the past vertically integrated company structure. One unintended result of this otherwise sound industry change is the relocation of critical microelectronics manufacturing capabilities from the United States to countries with lower cost capital and operating environments. Trustworthiness and supply assurance for components used in critical military and infrastructure applications are casualties of this migration. Further, while not the focus of this study per se, the U.S. national technological leadership may be increasingly challenged by these changing industry dynamics; this poses long term national economic security concerns. Accordingly, for the DOD’s strategy of information superiority to remain viable, the Department requires: Trusted and assured supplies of integrated circuit (IC) components. A continued stream of exponential improvements in the processing capacity of microchips and new approaches to extracting military value from information. Trustworthiness of custom and commercial systems that support military operations – and the advances in microchip technology underlying our information superiority – however has been jeopardized. Trustworthiness includes confidence that classified or mission critical information contained in chip designs is not compromised, reliability is not degraded or untended design elements inserted in chips as a result of design or fabrication in conditions open to adversary agents. Trust cannot be added to integrated circuits after fabrication; electrical testing and reverse engineering cannot be relied upon to detect undesired alterations in military integrated circuits. HIGH PERFORMANCE MICROCHIP SUPPLY ___________________________________________ 3
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Page 10 and 11: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________
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FINDINGS __________________________
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FINDINGS __________________________
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RECOMMENDATIONS ___________________
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TERMS OF REFERENCE ________________
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TERMS OF REFERENCE ________________
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO __
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FUTURE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT _____
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RANDY GOODALL SEMATECH ____________
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TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM ___________
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TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM ___________
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COMPARISON OF ASIC AND FPGA SYSTEM
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DFAR SUPPLEMENT ___________________
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MINORITY REPORT ___________________
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ACRONYMS __________________________
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