High Performance Microchip Supply - Under Secretary of Defense ...

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________
subcontractors may be insufficient to perform a
credible threat assessment and mitigation plan.
Therefore, SPO and prime contractor
responsibility and leadership is essential.
− To ensure the success of (1) above, an education
program must be undertaken to assure that those
who are managing and developing the designs at
the SPO, prime contractor, and subcontractor
levels are well versed in potential threats. For
example, design data and the data used in the
mask-making function represent the best
opportunities for the inclusion of subversive
elements that can modify circuit function.
Frequent peer reviews of the design are
suggested as a way to detect unwanted
inclusions. Design and mask data integrity is
vital. Their transmission over secure lines is an
integral part of the trusted foundry program.
− Integrated circuit fabrication beyond the design
and mask phases offers less attractive
opportunities for covert circuit inclusions;
however, subtle process parameter changes can
still compromise lifetime and performance in
stressful environments. Consequently, it is the
unanimous opinion of this DSB task force that
the manufacture of mission-critical ASICs in
foundries that have not been certified as
“trusted” will (1) expose vital system intellectual
property to potential theft; (2) increase the risk of
unwanted design inclusions; and (3) possibly
violate existing International Traffic in Arms
(ITAR) export regulations. To mitigate these
risks, the acquisition system must require all
DOD laboratories and contractors to utilize the
trusted foundry program for all ASICs in
category 1 (mission-critical) subsystems, both
classified and unclassified. Waiver requests must
68 _________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE ON