High Performance Microchip Supply - Under Secretary of Defense ...

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________
from transient events. However, commercial entities
are reluctant to investigate or enhance these
possibilities for fear that it would subject their
designs to export controls. Export control policies
should be reexamined to determine the right balance
between increasing the suitability of standard parts
to certain applications versus increasing the number
of potential adversaries capable of mounting new
challenges to U.S. interests through the availability
of such parts. Loosening radiation-tolerance
restrictions, for example, would result in future
standard parts that could be used in military
systems, easing requirements for radiation-hardened
ASICs. The task force does not, however advocate
easing export restrictions on radiation-hardened
components.
Increase Efforts to Develop Tamper Protection
Technology. Once components have been proven
trustworthy, antitamper protection is essential to
protect chips from subversion or reverse
engineering. The ongoing contest between adversary
tamper efforts and U.S. defensive efforts in chip
protection requires a continuous program seeking
ever better ways to protect chip integrity.
Develop Design and Production Techniques for
Disguising the True Function of ICs. There may be
future instances in which use of untrusted foundries
is unavoidable. In those instances, camouflage
offers one possible protection against subversion.
The complexity of today’s ICs offers the option of
burying the true function of design in a sea of
confusing logic.
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