High Performance Microchip Supply - Under Secretary of Defense ...

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FINDINGS ___________________________________________________________________ applications (confidentiality, integrity, or availability). Today, offshore engineers design, develop, test, fabricate, remotely maintain, integrate, and upgrade some U.S. defense hardware and software. Regrettably, the United States currently has no effective strategy to weigh the obvious cost and time advantages of outsourcing offshore against the potential of component subversion. 33 If real and potential adversaries’ ability to subvert U.S. microelectronics components is not reversed or technically mitigated, our adversaries will gain enormous asymmetric advantages that could possibly put U.S. force projection at risk. In the end, the U.S. strategy must be one of risk management, not risk avoidance. Even if risk avoidance were possible, it would be prohibited by cost. Factors affecting the risk management calculation are numerous, complicated, and interdependent. They include Ability of an adversary to gain life-cycle access and keep such access secret Given access, an adversary’s capability to alter a component such that the alteration is difficult to detect and to attribute The adversary’s willingness to exploit such an opportunity The benefit to the adversary The impact of a compromise on the United States Capability of the United States to detect a modification Capability of the United States to attribute the modification Consequence to the adversary if the modification is detected and attributed to them 33. Some of these activities may be contrary to long-standing International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) export controls. While the U.S. has an extensive set of laws and regulations governing export of critical technologies, comprehension of their importance and application is not widespread. 50 _________________________________________________________ DSB TASK FORCE ON
__________________________________________________________________ FINDINGS Ability of the United States to limit the life-cycle access opportunities, for instance, to a trusted foundry Alternate approaches available to the adversary in achieving equivalent impact (i.e., software modification) Cost CONCLUSION The Department of Defense and its suppliers face a major integrated circuit supply dilemma that threatens the security and integrity of classified and sensitive circuit design information, the superiority and correct functioning of electronic systems, system reliability, continued supply of long-system-life components, and special-technology components. The department must solve this problem together with the rest of the defense community (i.e., defense suppliers). With few exceptions, today’s commercial industry will not perceive the same threats as DOD and will not adjust its operations to meet smallmanufacturing-volume military needs. DOD should also play an advocate role in U.S. attempts (through the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Committee for Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) process, Department of State (DoS), National Security Council (NSC), Department of Transportation (DoT)) to achieve trade and economic equity in the global semiconductor industry in order to discourage the industry’s migration abroad and incentivize the installation of future advanced technology integrated circuit manufacturing and design in the United States. DOD’s microelectronic problem is most severe at the leading technology edge and in special technologies, HIGH PERFORMANCE MICROCHIP SUPPLY ___________________________________________ 51
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Defense Science Board Task Force On
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Page 8 and 9: TABLE OF CONTENTS__________________
Page 10 and 11: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________
Page 22 and 23: INTRODUCTION ______________________
Page 34 and 35: FINDINGS __________________________
Page 62 and 63: RECOMMENDATIONS ___________________
Page 88: TERMS OF REFERENCE ________________
Page 92 and 93: TERMS OF REFERENCE ________________
Page 94: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMO __
Page 98 and 99: FUTURE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT _____
Page 104 and 105: RANDY GOODALL SEMATECH ____________
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TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM ___________
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TRUSTED FOUNDRY PROGRAM ___________
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COMPARISON OF ASIC AND FPGA SYSTEM
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DFAR SUPPLEMENT ___________________
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MINORITY REPORT ___________________
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ACRONYMS __________________________
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