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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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particularly the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> Committee‘s view that the duty may catch honest and careful proposers, and<br />

judicial criticisms voiced in 1975 in Lambert v Co-operative <strong>Insurance</strong> Society Ltd 102 and in earlier cases.<br />

3.71 The provisional conclusion reached by the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> was that the duty of disclosure<br />

―should be retained across the board‖ but the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> went on to distinguish between cases<br />

where the insurer did not make use of a proposal form from situations where a proposal form was utilised.<br />

3.72 In cases where no proposal form was used the duty<br />

―should be to disclose those facts which a reasonable man in his circumstances would<br />

consider to be material in the sense that they would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer<br />

in accepting the risk or fixing the premium. The insured should however only be under a duty<br />

to disclose facts which he either knows or which a reasonable man in his circumstances ought<br />

to know.‖ 103<br />

3.73 The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> explained that the formulation of the test, in particular the reference to ―a<br />

reasonable man in his circumstances,‖ sought to direct attention to the circumstances of the particular<br />

insured rather than imposing a wholly objective standard of ―a reasonable insured‖. The standard might<br />

depend on ―whether the insured was a businessman or consumer‖, but no recommendations on the<br />

precise range of relevant circumstances were made. Benefits of such a test were said to include<br />

dispensing with the need for expert evidence as to what would influence a prudent insurer. In opting for a<br />

constructive knowledge factor, such knowledge could be attributed to the reasonable man, the <strong>Law</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong> sought to clarify the law and bring non marine insurance contract duties into line with the<br />

marine insurance duty, as set out by section 18(1) of the Marine <strong>Insurance</strong> Act 1906.<br />

3.74 In cases where a proposal form was used the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> suggested a radical approach<br />

that hinged upon the <strong>Commission</strong>‘s dissatisfaction with the existing law:<br />

―Our provisional recommendation is that if a proposal form has been completed by the insured,<br />

insurers should not be permitted to say that a fact outside the scope of the questions asked is<br />

material and ought therefore to have been disclosed. Insurers should be taken to have waived<br />

the duty of disclosure in regard to that fact.‖ 104<br />

3.75 The proposer will be held to have discharged the duty of disclosure and the good faith<br />

obligation by providing complete and accurate answers to the questions asked. However, the proposal<br />

form must itself contain a statement in respect of the duty and the consequences of non compliance.<br />

3.76 The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> identified two difficulties in relation to the reformulated duty of disclosure<br />

vis-à-vis proposal form-based insurance contacts. The first obstacle to effective reform was the<br />

possibility that a proposer might well know something that would be material: for example, a proposer has<br />

received threats to burn down property from a disgruntled former employee but goes ahead in arranging<br />

fire insurance, the threat being outside the ambit of questions put in the proposal form. For this reason<br />

the English <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> recommended a residual duty ―not deliberately to conceal facts which he<br />

knows to be material and of which he has actual knowledge.‖ 105 The second obstacle to effective reform<br />

was the possibility that the insurer might ask a general question concerning any facts that a prudent<br />

insured should consider relevant. If` this were possible, the reforms would be side-stepped via a contract<br />

clause that would fill the gap left by waiver of the duty of disclosure. For this reason the English <strong>Law</strong><br />

<strong>Commission</strong> recommended that ―an insured should be entitled to ignore any such question and insurers<br />

should be deprived of any remedy in respect of false information supplied in answer to any such<br />

question‖.<br />

102<br />

103<br />

104<br />

105<br />

[1975] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 485.<br />

See paragraphs 59-64 of Working Paper No. 73.<br />

Paragraph 66.<br />

Paragraph 73.<br />

82

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