Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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of good faith. This declaratory provision should also make it clear that the policy is not avoided by reason<br />
of the making of the fraudulent claim but that any claim made on the basis of the fraud is forfeited.<br />
8.22 Support for this position is found in the PEICL, in the Australian Act and in Issues Papers 6 and<br />
7 produced by the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s in 2010. Article 6:102 PEICL operates in the context of a duty<br />
placed upon an insured to respond to an insurer‘s reasonable requests for information and the supply of<br />
documentary evidence and information generally. Implicit in this is an honesty and accuracy requirement.<br />
As an article that is labelled as a claims cooperation provision, the article distinguishes cases of breach<br />
simpliciter from breach with intent to cause prejudice or breaches made recklessly and with knowledge<br />
that predjudice would result. For breach simpliciter a proportionality remedy vis-a-vis the insurance<br />
money is the remedy. In the breach with intent context, ―the insurer shall not be obliged to pay the<br />
insurance money.‖<br />
8.23 The Australian <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Contracts</strong> Act 1984, relating to fraudulent claims provides at section<br />
56(1):<br />
―Where a claim under a contract of insurance, or a claim under this Act against an insurer by a<br />
person who is not the insured under a contract of insurance is made fraudulently, the insurer<br />
may not avoid the contract but may refuse payment of the claim.‖<br />
8.24 This part of section 56 has not proved controversial. The rest of the section however has been<br />
the subject of much adverse comment, as will be shown.<br />
8.25 In the specific context of section 17 and the Marine <strong>Insurance</strong> Act 1906 (it should be recalled<br />
that most of the influential recent cases on the forfeiture for fraudulent claims have not been marine<br />
insurance): the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s reached the ―tentative conclusion‖ that the section 56(1) Australian<br />
approach should be followed, a solution that the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s said was ―well established and<br />
accepted.‖ 44 The <strong>Commission</strong> will return to this question in Chapter 10, Remedies.<br />
E<br />
Other (contractual) remedies<br />
8.26 One question that arises is the scope of the duty of good faith and whether, by contract,<br />
remedies other than forfeiture will be available. Lord Hobhouse, in The Star Sea was extremely hostile to<br />
both an expansive view on the nature of the duty of good faith and the development of any post<br />
contractual duty of good faith. Any support for the idea that good faith was a continuing duty, post<br />
contract formation, was scant. Even accepting that the duty could be broken when an insured submitted<br />
a fraudulent claim, the weight of authority indicated that submission of such a claim did not give the<br />
insurer the right to treat the contract as void ab initio, but rather, the claim was forfeit by virtue of the<br />
fraud. Lord Hobhouse closed his analysis of the authorities by remarking that they ―show that suitable<br />
caution should be exercised in making any extensions to the law of non disclosure and that the courts<br />
should be on their guard against the use of the principle of good faith to achieve results which are only<br />
questionably capable of being reconciled with the mutual obligation to observe good faith.‖ Eggers et al<br />
speculate that should the parties to an insurance contract expressly provide for an insured to be under a<br />
duty not to submit a fraudulent claim, or a court be prepared to imply a term into a contract having such<br />
an effect, the applicable remedy would not be self evident, as the law stands. Clearly if the obligation is<br />
an express term the contract will be dispositive, but resort to implied terms as a source of the obligation<br />
will hardly provide a coherent basis for the remedy. Eggers cautions against expanding the law in an<br />
unbalanced and uncertain manner. 45<br />
44<br />
45<br />
Issues Paper 7, para. 4.81.<br />
Eggers, ‗Utmost Good Faith and the Presentation and Handling of Claims‘ in Soyer, <strong>Reform</strong>ing Marine and<br />
Commercial <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Law</strong>, p.229 at 235-6.<br />
169