Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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public interest in running blockades mounted by the Union forces and the vessel had been laid up in<br />
Liverpool for some time. The underwriter admitted that he had been aware of The Georgia‘s earlier<br />
exploits, but at the time of granting the policy he did not associate the confederate vessel with the risk<br />
being proposed. While the insurer had the means of discovering that the confederate cruiser and the ship<br />
being proposed were one and the same, he was under no duty to investigate and the proposer was not<br />
discharged from the duty of disclosure. Mellor J in his speech indicated that if a proposer was to be able<br />
to calculate just how little was needed in order to discharge the duty, this would be to introduce ―a most<br />
dangerous principle into the law of insurance‖, 68 and the judge stressed that the duty to provide a full and<br />
frank disclosure is at the heart of the duty.<br />
3.45 The second sense in which an insurer may not invoke non-disclosure of material fact is where<br />
the fact is one that an insurer is deemed to know. An insurer who is active in a specific trade or industry<br />
will be deemed to know what the characteristics of the sector are - the kind of goods used and activities<br />
that are undertaken respectively. Unusual risks or activities must be disclosed, however, but it is not<br />
necessary for the proposer to do anything more than disclose material facts. The proposer is not required<br />
to disclose any assessments or opinions or conclusions the proposer has made: insofar as the insurer is<br />
able to make these for himself, non-disclosure is not an invalidating factor. In Kreglinger and Fernau Ltd<br />
v Irish National <strong>Insurance</strong> Co Ltd 69 the defendants refused to honour performance bonds taken out in<br />
respect of meat processing contracts on the basis that specific undertakings in contracts had not been<br />
disclosed to them. In regarding this contract as a contract of utmost good faith, Davitt P considered that<br />
no breach of the duty of disclosure had taken place. The President drew a distinction between disclosure<br />
of the existence of a contract, the details of which had not been set out, and non-disclosure of material<br />
facts:<br />
―While the duty to make full disclosure of all matters material to the risk rests upon the insured,<br />
and it does not fall to the insurer to relieve him of that duty, by making inquiries, the converse is<br />
to this extent true, that the insured does not have to conduct the insurer‘s business for him.<br />
Where the contract, the performance of which the insurer is asked to cover, contains a clear<br />
intimation that a matter, which is specifically referred to but not fully set out, is of importance,<br />
and full information is to be had for the asking, it would be quite unreasonable and unjust to<br />
allow the insurer to repudiate liability on the grounds that he did not know and was not told the<br />
details of something which he was in fact told about.‖ 70<br />
3.46 Other illustrations of this exception to the duty of disclosure are provided by some decisions<br />
approved and followed by Davitt P in Kreglinger and Fernau. In The Bedouin 71 the insurer was not told<br />
that he was insuring freight under a time charter. The charter contained a standard cesser clause that in<br />
the view of the Court was practically universal in time charters and the insurer was held to have been<br />
given sufficient information to fix him with notice of the risk. Lord Esher MR remarked that the assured is<br />
neither bound to tell the insurer what the law is; nor is he required to tell him of every fact, but only<br />
material facts.<br />
68<br />
69<br />
70<br />
71<br />
Ibid at 608. Hasson (1969) 32 MLR 615 at 620 is critical of this decision. The ‗dangerous principle‘ referred to<br />
by Mellor J was concerned with preventing a proposer being encouraged to calculate how little need be<br />
disclosed in order to fix the insurer with knowledge.<br />
[1956] IR 116. Manor Park Homebuilders Ltd v AIG Europe (Ireland) Ltd [2009] 1 ILRM 190. The Canadian<br />
courts are moving towards a due diligence standard for insurers on the basis that ―technology has reduced the<br />
one-sidedness of the obligation of good faith with the growth and availability of information accessible to<br />
particular industries and the public generally.‖ Per Howden JA in De koning v Vector <strong>Insurance</strong> Network<br />
(Ontario) Ltd [2009] Can LII 43644 (Ont) discussing Coronation Ins Co v Taku Air Transport Ltd [1991] 3 SCR<br />
622. These cases cover transportation policies against statutory rules on disclosure of facts to regulatory<br />
bodies by insureds.<br />
[1956] IR 116 at 154.<br />
[1894] P.1.<br />
75