Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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and the consequences that follow on from an insurer seeking to acquire broader rights to avoid a policy<br />
by way of basis of contract clauses.<br />
5.64 In this Part, the <strong>Commission</strong> considers three issues that arise generally after the loss has<br />
materialised. Firstly, the existing law does not require the insurer to show that a promissory warranty as<br />
to the future was either material to the cause or a contributory factor to the loss. The <strong>Commission</strong><br />
considers whether the law should continue to reflect this position. Secondly, in the event that the law<br />
needs to be changed, the <strong>Commission</strong> considers whether a solution could be provided by Articles 4:102<br />
and 4:103 of the Principles of European <strong>Insurance</strong> Contract <strong>Law</strong> (PEICL). Thirdly, the <strong>Commission</strong><br />
explores the relationship between promissory warranties and exclusions in insurance contract law. In<br />
each of these three sections it will be seen that judicial activism has taken some of the sting out of these<br />
promissory warranties and exclusions but the <strong>Commission</strong> puts forward some possible legislative<br />
amendments that might make the law clearer and fairer, meeting the reasonable and commercial<br />
expectations of Irish insureds.<br />
(1) Warranties and Causation<br />
5.65 An insurer may seek to limit cover to a number of possible contingencies or seek to exclude<br />
from cover a range of eventualities by way of exclusion clauses. Restrictions of this kind are<br />
understandable and acceptable where the circumstances in question may extend the scope of the risk, as<br />
long as the restrictions are transparent and are reflected in the premium charged. However, where the<br />
restriction takes the form of a promissory warranty, there is a danger that individual insurers might be<br />
tempted to repudiate liability, even when there is no causal link between the loss that has occurred in a<br />
given case and the risk referred to in the policy.<br />
5.66 In some cases an insurer will take statistical or actuarial evidence that certain kinds of insureds<br />
or activities, or geographical locations, might lead to increases in risk; inexperienced drivers, specific<br />
winter sports activities or politically volatile holiday destinations may be the subject of exclusions or<br />
restrictions in relevant insurance policies; the use of motor vehicles for business or commercial purposes,<br />
as distinct from private use, affords an example. In Jones v Welsh <strong>Insurance</strong> Corporation 108 a motor<br />
policy restricted cover to business use of the insured qua his trade as a motor mechanic. The insured<br />
was also a part-time farmer. An accident occurred when the insured‘s brother was driving the vehicle and<br />
transporting two sheep and two lambs to grazing. The restrictions on cover meant that the loss was not<br />
recoverable. In Kelleher v Cristopherson 109 the claimant was a labourer who used his car to drive to and<br />
from his work at Haulbowline. The claimant kept a few pigs and regularly obtained pig swill from the<br />
canteen at his workplace, transporting the swill in his car. An accident occurred whilst transporting the<br />
pig swill on the claimant‘s returning from work. Judge Neylon took the view that the claimant was<br />
engaged in pig farming by way of a hobby or amusement, rather than by way of a business, distinguishing<br />
the decision in Jones on the basis that, in Jones, the insured was not driving the vehicle at the time of the<br />
accident and the business activity being undertaken was outside the insurance. In the instant case the<br />
fact that the insured was transporting swill was irrelevant. Judge Neylon continued:<br />
I cannot accept the proposition that by carrying swill he thereby converted a journey which was<br />
covered by insurance into one which was not so covered. It appears to me that when a person<br />
is using his car for a purpose which is apparently covered by his policy of insurance, there is a<br />
very heavy onus on the insurance company to discharge before it can establish that such a<br />
user has ceased to be insured by reason of some action of the insured. As in this case, it is a<br />
fact that the insured was returning home from work and thus is covered by insurance. To<br />
deprive him of this benefit it must be proved that he has done something which alters the<br />
nature of the journey or user of the car. 110<br />
108<br />
109<br />
110<br />
[1937] 4 All ER 149.<br />
(1957) 91 ILTR 191.<br />
(1957) 91 ILTR 191, at 195.<br />
125