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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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verbal or written questions at formation stage, as well as at post formation stage vis-à-vis policy terms<br />

and exclusions, the weight of Irish authority is in favour of viewing and interpreting ambiguous questions<br />

in a proposal form, and provisions within the policy itself against the party who prepared the question or<br />

contract term. In Rohan Construction Ltd v <strong>Insurance</strong> Corporation of Ireland Ltd 13 Keane J cautioned<br />

against giving a meaning to a contractual term which is strained or artificial:<br />

―if there is any ambiguity in the language used it is to be construed more strongly against the<br />

party who prepared it, i.e. in most cases against the insurer. It is also clear that the words<br />

used must not be construed with extreme literalism, but with reasonable latitude, keeping<br />

always in view the principal object of the contract of insurance‖<br />

4.09 In the context of ambiguities in a proposal form the leading case is Re Sweeney & Kennedy's<br />

Arbitration. 14 An application form asked the proposer if any of his drivers are ―under 21 years of age or<br />

with less than 12 months experience‖. The proposer truthfully answered in the negative but at a later<br />

date he hired a driver who failed to satisfy these conditions. An attempt to avoid the policy on the basis<br />

that a promissory warranty as to the future was implicitly built into the contract failed. In Analog Devices<br />

BV v Zurich <strong>Insurance</strong> Company, 15 the Supreme Court has specifically endorsed the view that exclusions<br />

from cover in an ―all risks‖ policy should be read contra proferens. More recently, in McAleenan v AIG<br />

(Europe) Ltd 16 Finlay Geoghegan J has reaffirmed these propositions in the context of professional<br />

indemnity insurance, pointing out however that contra proferens interpretation only arises if there is an<br />

ambiguity in the first place, Finlay Geoghegan J finding such an ambiguity over whether the policy in<br />

question was a composite and not a joint policy, creating individual contractual rights for employees of the<br />

firm.<br />

4.10 While Keane J‘s view in Rohan Construction and the contra proferens approach mandated in<br />

Analog are not necessarily irreconcilable, there is a tension between these approaches in the sense that<br />

reading a clause against the party who prepared it need not necessarily be the same approach as giving<br />

the question or term the meaning that a reasonable person would deduce from the words themselves.<br />

There are English cases that do not favour contra proferens interpretation of exclusions, 17 and after the<br />

House of Lords had distanced itself from a priori rules of construction in Investors Compensation Scheme<br />

Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society, 18 there is a clear movement away from using the contra proferens<br />

approach in insurance contracts. In McGeown v Direct Travel <strong>Insurance</strong> 19 Auld LJ said that too early a<br />

recourse to contra proferentem involved a danger of creating an ambiguity where there is none. Clarke J,<br />

in Danske Banke v McFadden 20 has recently expressed agreement with the view that the contra<br />

proferens approach to interpretation may not be suitable where contractual terms may have been<br />

individually negotiated, and in any event Clarke J did not find it of assistance in interpreting the terms of a<br />

guarantee coauthored as a joint effort by the parties.<br />

4.11 It may be that the issue of how to interpret an ambiguous question should best be left for future<br />

judicial development. In Analog the Supreme Court specifically endorsed both contra proferens<br />

interpretation and Lord Hoffmann‘s speech in West Bromwich and the tension between these approaches<br />

13<br />

14<br />

15<br />

16<br />

17<br />

18<br />

19<br />

20<br />

[1986] ILRM 419. See also Walkers v London and Provincial <strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1888) 22LR Ir 572.<br />

[1986] ILRM 419.at 423-4: see Griffin J‘s ―reasonable persons‖ test in the Supreme Court [1988] ILRM 373.<br />

[1950] IR 85.<br />

[2010] IEHC 128; Emo Oil Ltd v Sun Alliance [2009] IESC2.<br />

See also O‟Reilly v Irish Life Assurance plc [2005] IEHC 449 (rejection of consumer insured test).<br />

[1998] 1 All ER 98.<br />

[2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 609. In Clear Homes v Sarcon No 177 Ltd [2010] NI Ch 16 Deeny J characterised<br />

contra proferens, in the light of Lord Hoffmann‘s analysis, as a rule of last resort when all other rules of<br />

interpretation fail.<br />

[2010] IEHC 116, citing in particular Levinson v Farin [1978] 2 AllER 1149 and Oxonica Energy Ltd v Neuftec<br />

Ltd [2008] EWHC 2127 (Pat).<br />

93

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