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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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Nevertheless, it was the policy against wagering underlying the 1745 Act that proved to be the decisive<br />

issue in the leading decision of Lucena v Craufurd. 27 Briefly, the facts were that commissioners had been<br />

given statutory authority to take charge of Dutch ships and cargoes in England. Acting under the orders<br />

of the Admiralty, a Royal Navy ship took several Dutch ships at sea. The commissioners then arranged to<br />

insure the ships while they were on their way to England. They were lost before arrival. While the<br />

provisions of the legislation meant that the commissioners would clearly have had an insurable interest in<br />

the ships if they reached these shores, the issue was whether such an interest existed before their arrival.<br />

The case was first argued before Lord Kenyon CJ and a special jury at the Guildhall in 1799; it was then<br />

appealed through the Court of King's Bench and the Exchequer Chamber, and finally reached the House<br />

of Lords in 1802.<br />

2.15 The overwhelming majority of the judges in the lower courts referred to the second ground<br />

given by Lord Mansfield for his decision in Le Cras as support for their view that the commissioners<br />

possessed an insurable interest, that is, the Crown had previously and invariably obtained and granted<br />

prize rights to the crew. Seizure of the Navy gave the Crown an interest that could produce inchoate<br />

interests in others. Similarly, the majority of the judges called to give their advice to the House of Lords<br />

argued that `a vested interest is not necessary to give the right of insuring. The commissioners had a<br />

contingent interest; and supposing the intentions of the Crown to remain unaltered, nothing stood<br />

between them and the vesting of that contingent interest but the perils insured against'. 28 The judges<br />

summed up their approach:<br />

―The question always is, whether the policy be a gaming contract? If it be no artifice how can it<br />

elude the force of the statute? The case of Le Cras v Hughes was infinitely more likely to<br />

introduce an abuse of the statute than the present case. That has been decided above 20<br />

years; yet what ill consequences have followed? The same may be said of valued policies. In<br />

the case of wagering policies, any number of persons may make insurances on the same ship.<br />

But that is not the case here. If the commissioners could not insure this property, the Dutch<br />

owners could not; and it would be a strange paradox to assert, that these are ships and<br />

cargoes subject to all the perils of the sea in their voyage, and yet none are competent to<br />

insure them.‘ 29<br />

2.16 There were two very strong dissenting voices in the House of Lords. Chambre J held that the<br />

statute appointing the <strong>Commission</strong>ers afforded no right over the property until arrival in the jurisdiction.<br />

While <strong>Law</strong>rence J in his dissenting judgment similarly denied the existence of insurable interest, his<br />

reasoning differed. It is worth considering his opinion at some length because of its enduring influence.<br />

He began by defining the nature of an insurance contract in terms of the protection it afforded the insured<br />

partly not merely against loss resulting in deprivation of property but also against uncertain events which<br />

may lead to some other disadvantage, such as loss of anticipated profit. The risk of such loss, damage or<br />

other prejudice is thereby shifted to the insurer.<br />

2.17 Having spoken generally about the nature of interest and insurance, <strong>Law</strong>rence J went on to<br />

formulate what has become known as the factual expectation test:<br />

―To be interested in the preservation of a thing, is to be so circumstanced with respect to it as<br />

to have benefit from its existence, prejudice from its destruction. The property of a thing and<br />

the interest devisable from it may be very different: of the first the price is generally the<br />

measure, but by interest in a thing every benefit and advantage arising out of or depending on<br />

such thing, may be considered as being as comprehended.‖ 30<br />

27<br />

28<br />

29<br />

30<br />

(1802) 3 Bos. & Pul. 75 (Exchequer Chamber) ; (1806) 2 Bos. & Pul. NR 269 (House of Lords).<br />

Before the House of Lords, (1806) 2 Bos. & Pul. NR 269 Le Blanc J, Grose J and Sir James Mansfield CJ took<br />

the same view as the majority in the Exchequer Chamber (they were joined by judges that had already been<br />

of the majority in the lower court – Graham B, Rooke J and Heath J)<br />

(1806) 2 Bos. & Pul. NR 269 at 297<br />

Ibid, at 302-3.<br />

33

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