Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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decisions, and case-law, that prevent an insurer from being judge and jury in relation to allegations on<br />
criminal misconduct. 139<br />
5.84 There may still be room to consider whether Article 4:102 goes further than is necessary or<br />
desirable. Promissory warranties may serve important social objectives in the sense that proscriptive<br />
rules concerning security measures (for example, in property insurance) might deter burglaries (and even<br />
crimes of violence). Should an insurer be able to contract for precautionary measures to be observed,<br />
even if the contractual standard is one of reasonable care, rather, than intention, or recklessness, as set<br />
by Article 4:102?<br />
(3) The Causation Problem and Promissory Warranties – Article 4:103<br />
5.85 Because the PEICL does not envisage the possibility that breach of a promissory warranty will<br />
either automatically entitle the insurer to avoid liability for loss that has arisen, nor terminate the contract,<br />
per se, any clause that seeks to contractually secure either of these rights will have to satisfy Article<br />
4:102. Article 4:102 does not address the causation problem, while Article 4:103 does. Headed<br />
―Discharge of the Insurer‘s Liability‖, it follows the same structure as Article 4:102:<br />
(1) A clause that non-compliance with a precautionary measure totally or partially exempts<br />
the insurer from liability, shall only have effect to the extent that the loss was caused by<br />
the non-compliance of the policyholder or insured with intent to cause the loss or<br />
recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result.<br />
(2) Subject to a clear clause providing for reduction of the insurance money according to the<br />
degree of fault, the policyholder or insured, as the case may be, shall be entitled to<br />
insurance money in respect of any loss caused by negligent non-compliance with a<br />
precautionary measure.<br />
5.86 Article 4:102 deals with the problem outlined by the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s in their 2007<br />
Consultation Paper (ie a fire sprinkler that is out of operation despite a warranty to maintain is the basis<br />
upon which a claim for flood damage is rejected). The breach of the promissory warranty to maintain is<br />
simply irrelevant. The comments to Article 4:103 show that this provision is intended to go much further:<br />
―Non-compliance with a requirement of a sprinkler in full operation in a fire policy therefore may<br />
have the effect of excluding the insurer‘s liability for loss caused by fire if the loss would have<br />
been avoided by a fully operating sprinkler. In addition, the insurer‘s liability may be reduced if<br />
the loss caused by fire could not have been fully avoided by an operating sprinkler (for<br />
example in case of lightning) but has only increased due to the absence of such a sprinkler. In<br />
that case the insurer‘s liability would only be reduced as far as the non-compliance contributed<br />
to the extent of the loss. The onus of proving the prerequisites for a discharge of the insurer‘s<br />
liability, including a causal link between non-compliance and loss, is on the insurer.‖ 140<br />
5.87 The facts of he Bennett case, discussed earlier, tease out an interesting aspect of Article<br />
4:103(2). There, the fire was caused by non-compliance with a waste materials clause that essentially<br />
involved strict liability. The insured was not alleged to have been negligent in taking reasonable<br />
precautions to avoid the loss from occurring (a distinct obligation separate from the waste clause<br />
requiring removal of waste materials from the premises). The causation link was thus established by the<br />
insurer. But in the case of the fault element, it is likely that a court would not have found the insured to<br />
have been negligent. Even careful insureds are to be expected to find that accidents happen. The<br />
authors of the PEICL argue that the ‗basic‘ philosophy is that insurance is taken out not just for accidental<br />
risks but also for cases or negligent behaviour.‖ 141 The authors of the PEICL go on to state that if a<br />
clause is intended to limit the insurer‘s liability to compensate for a loss that is caused negligently (as<br />
139<br />
140<br />
141<br />
Eg Gray v Hibernian <strong>Insurance</strong> Unreported, H.C. May 27, 1993; Financial Services Ombudsman Decision of<br />
July – December 2006, p.8.<br />
PEICL, p.176.<br />
Irish law contains a similar observation: Jameson v The Royal <strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1873) IR 7 CL 126.<br />
132