Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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insurer is seeking to avoid the contract ab initio and it is arguable that the decision by the insurer to avoid<br />
may pre-empt any judicial discretion; Professor Malcolm Clarke has made this argument and even though<br />
it has been rejected by other authorities there is no clear judicial decision on the point. Furthermore, the<br />
relevance of the section to cases where an insurer seeks to avoid the contract for a breach of a<br />
representation of fact that has been converted into a contractual term – for example, the insurances<br />
proposal form or the policy makes a statement of fact a warranty – has not been established by case-law,<br />
but there does not seem to be any judicial discussion on such an obvious point. The learned authors of<br />
Chitty on <strong>Contracts</strong> observe that while the point is an open one this is not thought to be the result of s.2(2)<br />
and that ―in any event it is very unlikely that the court would exercise its jurisdiction to prevent an insurer<br />
rescinding on the ground of misrepresentation by the insured.‖ With respect, this seems to be a curious<br />
argument. If fraud is removed from the equation, there is no reason why a court could not decide that an<br />
innocent misrepresentation might be best remedied through an award of damages, regardless of whether<br />
the statement is or is not a contractual term. The same may also hold true in cases where the<br />
representation was made negligently. The section 2(2) discretion appears to be rather inelastic if<br />
observations of the kind made by Chitty represent the law.<br />
10.31 It might be possible to build upon section 45(2) of the 1980 Act by clarifying that the judicial<br />
discretion does indeed apply to instances of ab initio avoidance and that the discretion applies even to<br />
misrepresentations that are integrated into the contract as warranties of existing or future fact. It is<br />
arguable that such a revision of s.45(2) would inject into this provision some of the vitality that the authors<br />
of the provision had in mind when this reform was initially contemplated in England and Wales.<br />
(c) Damages – measure of loss under section 45(2)<br />
10.32 As shown above, section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 (UK) and section 45(2) of the<br />
Sale of Goods and Services Act 1980 have not been used to any extent and there are no authoritative<br />
decisions on the measure of loss that a court would award should the discretion be exercised.<br />
10.33 In the 1980 Report the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> did not address the relationship between the 1967 Act<br />
and insurance law. The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s, in the 2007 Consultation Paper appear to have discounted<br />
the s.2(2) remedy on the ground that case-law is against applying the provision to commercial insurance<br />
and because the measure of damages ―is obscure‖ 31 . The <strong>Commission</strong> is forced to conclude that the<br />
uncertain nature of section 45 of the 1980 Act makes it an unsatisfactory basis upon which to build a<br />
compensatory remedy. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether these objections to judicial use of section<br />
45(2) are necessarily valid, especially in the light of the Consumer <strong>Insurance</strong> (Disclosure and<br />
Representations) Bill 2011. Schedule 1 of the Bill provides a set of rules that should guide any judge<br />
when deciding whether to exercise any discretion available in respect of section 45(2) of the 1980 Act and<br />
the relevant provisions are these (in abridged form):<br />
10.34 The insurer‘s remedies are based on what it would have done if the proposer had complied<br />
with the duty. If the insurer would not have entered into the insurance contract on any terms, the insurer<br />
may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, but must return the premiums paid. If the insurer would<br />
have entered into the insurance contract, but on different terms (exluding terms relating to the premium),<br />
the contract is to be treated as if it had been entered into on those different terms if the insurer so<br />
requires. In addition, if the insurer would have entered into the insurance contract (whether the terms<br />
relating to matters other than the premium would have been the same or different), but would have<br />
charged a higher premium, the insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim.<br />
―Reduce proportionately‖ means that the insurer would need to pay on the claim only X% of what it would<br />
otherwise have been under an obligation to pay under the terms of the contract.<br />
D<br />
Compensatory Remedies – damages for late payment of a claim<br />
10.35 One of the most controversial aspects of insurance contract law is not addressed by the <strong>Law</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong> in their 2007 Consultation Paper, possibly because the question resonates across the law<br />
relating to compensatory reliefs in commercial law. Should the insurer be required to pay compensatory<br />
damages to an insured when the failure by the insurer to settle a claim has caused consequential loss?<br />
31 Consultation Paper 2007, para.2.14.<br />
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