Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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the relevant terms are those that give a crucial definition of the type and subject of insurance,<br />
the insured risk, the insurer‘s liability, the insurance benefit, the sum insured, the insured<br />
interest or the insurable value. Terms restricting, changing, elaborating or modifying the<br />
insurer‘s obligation to perform are, however, not core terms and therefore subject to review<br />
under Article 2:304 40 .<br />
6.30 The most important safeguards that European consumers have under the Unfair Contract<br />
Terms Directive are arguably, procedural other than substantive. For even a core term to qualify for<br />
exemption from scrutiny, that is, the danger that a contractual term will be invalid because:<br />
(1) it is unfair (e.g. as appearing on a grey list)<br />
(2) it was not individually negotiated<br />
(3) contrary to the requirements of good faith and fair dealing, it causes a significant<br />
imbalance in the rights and obligations of parties and is detrimental to the interests of the<br />
consumer.<br />
The term in question must satisfy the following two key requirements.<br />
6.31 First, the exemption has to be in plain language. Article 4(2) of the Directive mandates that,<br />
the exemption from scrutiny applies insofar as these terms are in plain intelligible language. The <strong>Law</strong><br />
<strong>Commission</strong>s also reject Professor Malcolm Clarke‘s view that recital 19 does not insist on such a<br />
requirement, pointing out that article 4(2) takes precedence over recital 19 and that, in any case, recital<br />
19 itself requires a core term to ―clearly‖ define or circumscribe the insured risk. The scope of this<br />
requirement is uncertain. For example, is an average provision one which defines the risk or<br />
circumscribes the risk? Even if it is not a core term, does the term have to be explained (e.g. by way of<br />
examples on the consequences of under insuring)?<br />
6.32 The second condition is that the reasonable expectations of the consumer. Although the<br />
decision of MacMenamin J in O‟Reilly v Irish Life Assurance plc 41 is somewhat inconclusive on the scope<br />
of any duty to provide a bargain which reflects the reasonable expectations of a proposer/insured, the<br />
case articulates the view that the process of interpreting an insurance policy seeks to:<br />
―find the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the<br />
background knowledge reasonably available to the parties, including anything which would<br />
have affected the way a reasonable person would have understood it but excluding previous<br />
negotiations or subjective intent.‖ 42<br />
Even commercial bargains should not be occasions for imposition or ―surprise‖. It is for such reasons that<br />
oral contracts are not generally interpreted so as to contain unusual or non-standard provisions that were<br />
perhaps tucked away in preliminary documents: Capes (Hatherton) Ltd v Western Arable Services. 43<br />
Within the specific context of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s argue that recital<br />
20 requires not only that the terms of the contract should be drafted in plain, intelligible language, but also<br />
the consumer should be given the opportunity to examine all the terms. The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s have<br />
endorsed the view of the Office of Fair Trading that a core term will only be exempt from review as<br />
defining the main subject matter of the contract ―if it is part of the way consumers perceived the bargain‖.<br />
Tucking terms or disclaimers away into contracts in places where a consumer is unlikely to see it, and<br />
even providing terms or disclaimers after the contract has been agreed could well fall foul of such<br />
40<br />
41<br />
42<br />
43<br />
Ibid.<br />
[2005] IEHC 449.<br />
At para 87. Although noticeably cool on Steyn L.J.‘s speech in First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian International<br />
Bank Ltd [1993] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep 194 at 196, MacMenamin J‘s approach is not, it is submitted, very different to<br />
Steyn L.J.‘s desire to ensure that ―the reasonable expectations of honest men must be protected‖.<br />
[2010] 1 Lloyd‘s Rep.477. See in particular both the English High Court and Court of Appeal decisions in<br />
William McIlroy (Swindon) Ltd v Quinn <strong>Insurance</strong> [2011] EWCA Civ 825.<br />
145