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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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ii)<br />

(i)<br />

Where the insured and the wrongdoer are parties to an employment contract with each other<br />

so as to trigger vicarious liability.<br />

Subrogation – Intra Family Claims<br />

10.71 In the first situation, the 1982 Australian ALRC Report made the following observation:<br />

―It is not appropriate that subrogation be available in circumstances where double indemnity is,<br />

as a practical matter, not in issue and where the liability to be relied upon. The most obvious<br />

cases concern domestic insurance. In the field of householder‘s insurance, for example, cover<br />

is offer extended to members of the insured‘s family living with him in the household. But it is<br />

not extended to members of his family living apart, nor to other close relatives or friends who<br />

might visit him. Suppose an insured makes a claim for damage to furniture caused by a fire<br />

started when a relative of the insured carelessly dropped a lighted match into a wastepaper<br />

basket. Unless the relative carries liability cover, there would normally be no question of the<br />

insured himself seeking to recover damages for his relative‘s negligence. Yet the insurer is<br />

entitled to bring an action against the relative in the insured‘s name‖ 75<br />

10.72 This situation has arisen for consideration in Ireland. In Moynihan v Moynihan 76 the plaintiff, a<br />

two year old child, injured herself whilst visiting the home of her grandmother as a result of what Henchy J<br />

called ―an unforeseeable sequence of fortuities‖. The injuries occurred due to the alleged negligence of<br />

the grandmother and Marie, one of the plaintiff‘s aunts in relation to voluntary acts of supervision. As<br />

such, the plaintiff‘s case tested the boundaries or vicarious liability for it was clear that no employment<br />

relationship existed of any kind. Nevertheless, Walsh J, O‘Higgins CJ concurring, found that the trial<br />

judge was wrong to withdraw the issue of liability from the jury on the basis that the grandmother could<br />

not be vicariously liable, in law, for the gratuitous acts of Marie. Henchy J dissented saying that the<br />

absence of any employment relationship between the defendant and her daughter Marie, ―the<br />

circumstances of the accident do not fit into any of the exceptions to the rule that a principal is not liable<br />

for the negligence of an independent contractor or a gratuitous helper or a delegate who is not a<br />

servant.‖ 77<br />

10.73 One can only speculate on the possibility that the defendant was selected because some<br />

policy of domestic insurance was in place in her name; Marie may have been put in the supervisory role<br />

but possibly was not insured against such an event. Henchy J was clearly aware of such a scenario:<br />

―Much as one might wish that the law would allow this plaintiff to recover damages from some<br />

quarter for the consequences of the unfortunate accident that befell her, the inescapable fact is<br />

that there is a complete absence of authority for the proposition that liability should fall on the<br />

defendant (who was innocent of any causative fault) rather than on Marie whose conduct is<br />

alleged to have been primarily responsible for the accident. I see no justification for stretching<br />

the law so as to make it cover the present claim when, by doing so, the effect would be that<br />

liability in negligence would attach to persons for casual and gratuitous acts of others, as to the<br />

performance of which they would be personally blameless and against the risks of which they<br />

could not reasonably have been expected to be insured. To transfer or extend liability in these<br />

circumstances from the blameworthy person to a blameless person would involve the redress<br />

of one wrong by the creation of another. It would be unfair and oppressive to exact<br />

compensatory damages from a person for an act done on his behalf, especially in the case of<br />

an intrinsically harmless act, if it was done in a negligent manner which he could not<br />

reasonably have foreseen and if—unlike an employer, or a person with a primarily personal<br />

duty of care, or a motor-car owner, or the like—he could not reasonably have been expected to<br />

be insured against the risk of that negligence.‖ 78<br />

75<br />

76<br />

77<br />

78<br />

ALRC Report No 20, paragraph 305.<br />

[1975] IR 192.<br />

[1975] IR 192 at 202.<br />

[1975] IR 192 at 202-3<br />

212

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