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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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5.67 Nevertheless, the law reports are full of cases 111 where common law courts allow an insurer to<br />

rely either on an object clause, or an exception, to refuse to honour a policy in circumstances where an<br />

event or omission occurred, having no causal link with the accident. The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> of England<br />

and Wales and the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s, have repeatedly cited decisions that dictate that promissory<br />

warranties, when breached, give the insurer ―the right to repudiate the whole contract from the date of the<br />

breach regardless of the materiality of the term, the state of the mind of the insured, or the connection<br />

between the breach and the loss.‖ 112 This situation is made even more difficult by virtue of the fact that<br />

promissory warranties may be imputed relatively easily if the promise itself speaks to the future and it is<br />

clear that the only real purpose that the warranty could have would be to commit the insured to meet the<br />

terms of the stipulation on a continuing basis. Although there are some cases where the Irish courts<br />

have read a promissory statement as having no such effect, 113 the weight of Irish case-law in relation to<br />

conditions precedent as importing future obligations tend to favour the insurer. 114<br />

5.68 The first meaningful analysis of this situation took place in New Zealand. The <strong>Contracts</strong> and<br />

Commercial <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> Committee 115 critically examined two New Zealand decisions that allowed an<br />

insurer to avoid liability when promissory warranties were held to have a temporal element (ie cover not<br />

available whilst certain facts existed).<br />

5.69 This New Zealand case-law concerned accidents involving motor vehicles being driven whilst<br />

in an unsafe condition (eg bald tyres). 116 The fact that the vehicle was being driven at a time when the<br />

condition itself would not have caused the accident was held in these cases not to disentitle the insurer<br />

from repudiating the policy. In Parsons v Falmers Mutual <strong>Insurance</strong> Association 117 an exclusion from<br />

cover of a driver ―whilst intoxicated‖ became relevant after the insured was killed outright when the<br />

vehicle he was driving struck a bridge. The insured‘s intoxicated condition was not in issue but there was<br />

scant evidence that the degree of impairment contributed to the accident. Nevertheless, the New<br />

Zealand Court of Appeal held that the exclusion whilst intoxicated:<br />

―gave an insurance company a broad means of relieving the company from liability, the<br />

underlying consideration being that he who is intoxicated is far more likely to suffer bodily injury<br />

by accident than he who is sober. It is clear that the word ―whilst‖ does not import a causative<br />

relationship between the state of intoxication and the happening of the event amounting to<br />

accident.‖ 118<br />

5.70 Section 11 of the <strong>Insurance</strong> Act 1977 accordingly introduced a mechanism whereby the<br />

insured could recover upon proving, on the balance of probability that the loss was not caused or<br />

111<br />

112<br />

113<br />

114<br />

115<br />

116<br />

117<br />

118<br />

See MacGillivray, para. 10-040. The causal connection requirement in Civilian systems for precautionary<br />

measures is discussed in the ‗mixed‘ South African system by Van Niekerk at (2010) 22 Sa Merc LJ 259,<br />

arguing that judicial endorsement of the Civil law approach can be found in earlier Roman-Dutch law decisions<br />

and that a modern South African court should act ―to put the matter beyond doubt‖ (p.271).<br />

Eg <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Working Paper No. 73, para. 99, citing inter alia Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Comp 785,<br />

587; De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343.<br />

Eg Gorman v The Hand in Hand <strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1877) IR 11 CL 224; Weir v Northern Counties of England<br />

<strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1879) 4 LR Ir 689.<br />

Gamble v Accident Assurance Co Ltd (1869) IR 4 CL; Patton v Employers‟ Liability <strong>Insurance</strong> Corp (1887) 20<br />

LR Ir 689; Re the Equitable <strong>Insurance</strong> Co Ltd [1970] IR 45. Note that the Supreme Court, in Capmel Ltd v<br />

Lister (No.1) [1989] IR 319 dismissed an appeal from Costello J holding for an insured on the basis that the<br />

onus lay on the insurer to draft a condition precedent in such a way as to have the desired result.<br />

Reporting in 1975.<br />

State <strong>Insurance</strong> General Manager v Harray [1973] 1 NZLR 276; Yaxley v New Zealand <strong>Insurance</strong> Co Ltd<br />

[1973] 2 NZLR 231.<br />

[1972] NZLR 966.<br />

[1972] NZLR 966 at 976, (MacArthur J), citing Public Trustee v NIMU <strong>Insurance</strong> Co [1967] NZLR 530 and<br />

Abraham v Norwich Union Fire <strong>Insurance</strong> Society Ltd [1970] NZLR 968.<br />

126

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