Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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5.67 Nevertheless, the law reports are full of cases 111 where common law courts allow an insurer to<br />
rely either on an object clause, or an exception, to refuse to honour a policy in circumstances where an<br />
event or omission occurred, having no causal link with the accident. The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> of England<br />
and Wales and the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s, have repeatedly cited decisions that dictate that promissory<br />
warranties, when breached, give the insurer ―the right to repudiate the whole contract from the date of the<br />
breach regardless of the materiality of the term, the state of the mind of the insured, or the connection<br />
between the breach and the loss.‖ 112 This situation is made even more difficult by virtue of the fact that<br />
promissory warranties may be imputed relatively easily if the promise itself speaks to the future and it is<br />
clear that the only real purpose that the warranty could have would be to commit the insured to meet the<br />
terms of the stipulation on a continuing basis. Although there are some cases where the Irish courts<br />
have read a promissory statement as having no such effect, 113 the weight of Irish case-law in relation to<br />
conditions precedent as importing future obligations tend to favour the insurer. 114<br />
5.68 The first meaningful analysis of this situation took place in New Zealand. The <strong>Contracts</strong> and<br />
Commercial <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> Committee 115 critically examined two New Zealand decisions that allowed an<br />
insurer to avoid liability when promissory warranties were held to have a temporal element (ie cover not<br />
available whilst certain facts existed).<br />
5.69 This New Zealand case-law concerned accidents involving motor vehicles being driven whilst<br />
in an unsafe condition (eg bald tyres). 116 The fact that the vehicle was being driven at a time when the<br />
condition itself would not have caused the accident was held in these cases not to disentitle the insurer<br />
from repudiating the policy. In Parsons v Falmers Mutual <strong>Insurance</strong> Association 117 an exclusion from<br />
cover of a driver ―whilst intoxicated‖ became relevant after the insured was killed outright when the<br />
vehicle he was driving struck a bridge. The insured‘s intoxicated condition was not in issue but there was<br />
scant evidence that the degree of impairment contributed to the accident. Nevertheless, the New<br />
Zealand Court of Appeal held that the exclusion whilst intoxicated:<br />
―gave an insurance company a broad means of relieving the company from liability, the<br />
underlying consideration being that he who is intoxicated is far more likely to suffer bodily injury<br />
by accident than he who is sober. It is clear that the word ―whilst‖ does not import a causative<br />
relationship between the state of intoxication and the happening of the event amounting to<br />
accident.‖ 118<br />
5.70 Section 11 of the <strong>Insurance</strong> Act 1977 accordingly introduced a mechanism whereby the<br />
insured could recover upon proving, on the balance of probability that the loss was not caused or<br />
111<br />
112<br />
113<br />
114<br />
115<br />
116<br />
117<br />
118<br />
See MacGillivray, para. 10-040. The causal connection requirement in Civilian systems for precautionary<br />
measures is discussed in the ‗mixed‘ South African system by Van Niekerk at (2010) 22 Sa Merc LJ 259,<br />
arguing that judicial endorsement of the Civil law approach can be found in earlier Roman-Dutch law decisions<br />
and that a modern South African court should act ―to put the matter beyond doubt‖ (p.271).<br />
Eg <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> Working Paper No. 73, para. 99, citing inter alia Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Comp 785,<br />
587; De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343.<br />
Eg Gorman v The Hand in Hand <strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1877) IR 11 CL 224; Weir v Northern Counties of England<br />
<strong>Insurance</strong> Co (1879) 4 LR Ir 689.<br />
Gamble v Accident Assurance Co Ltd (1869) IR 4 CL; Patton v Employers‟ Liability <strong>Insurance</strong> Corp (1887) 20<br />
LR Ir 689; Re the Equitable <strong>Insurance</strong> Co Ltd [1970] IR 45. Note that the Supreme Court, in Capmel Ltd v<br />
Lister (No.1) [1989] IR 319 dismissed an appeal from Costello J holding for an insured on the basis that the<br />
onus lay on the insurer to draft a condition precedent in such a way as to have the desired result.<br />
Reporting in 1975.<br />
State <strong>Insurance</strong> General Manager v Harray [1973] 1 NZLR 276; Yaxley v New Zealand <strong>Insurance</strong> Co Ltd<br />
[1973] 2 NZLR 231.<br />
[1972] NZLR 966.<br />
[1972] NZLR 966 at 976, (MacArthur J), citing Public Trustee v NIMU <strong>Insurance</strong> Co [1967] NZLR 530 and<br />
Abraham v Norwich Union Fire <strong>Insurance</strong> Society Ltd [1970] NZLR 968.<br />
126