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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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carefully and responsibly when seeking to enter into a contract of insurance. The <strong>Commission</strong> would<br />

welcome views on whether this situation should be addressed in the forthcoming Report on <strong>Insurance</strong><br />

<strong>Contracts</strong> but the <strong>Commission</strong>, at this time, would not favour creation of such discretionary powers.<br />

10.17 Perhaps the most problematical question that arises is the scope of the <strong>Commission</strong>‘s<br />

recommendations relating to the creation of a compensatory remedy. Should the shift away from<br />

avoidance and rescission as the insurer‘s primary remedy to damages (save in instances of fraud) apply<br />

across the board? This is the situation in Australia. In the United Kingdom the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s<br />

certainly felt that this should be the case, as a matter of principle, but the joint Consultation Paper<br />

stopped short of recommending the demise of the avoidance remedy in business insurance as well as in<br />

consumer insurance cases where the proposer has been negligent. In the 2009 Report this disctinction<br />

between fraudulent and negligent non disclosure and misrepresentation was maintained; the Consumer<br />

<strong>Insurance</strong> (Disclosure and Representations) Bill 2011 provides for different remedies for an insurer<br />

following upon deliberate or reckless misrepresentations and careless misrepresentations. In the first<br />

situation the insurer may avoid the contract and refuse all claims, retaining the premium except to the<br />

extent that it would be unfair to the consumer to retain them. In cases of careless misrepesentations the<br />

remedies to the insurer are based upon what the insurer would have done had the duty not to make a<br />

misrepresentation been observed. If the insurer would not have entered the contract on any terms, the<br />

claim may be declined and the premiums returned. If the insured would have added terms (eg<br />

disclaimers) the contract should be read as if it contained those terms. If a higher premium would have<br />

been charged ―the insurer may reduce proportionately the amount to be paid on a claim. After taking the<br />

position that ―avoidance in every case of negligence over-compensates the insurer for the loss it has<br />

suffered‖ 22 the Joint Consultation Paper addressed three main arguments against restricting the<br />

availability of the avoidance remedy in business insurance.<br />

(1) it is difficult to prove the insured acted dishonestly;<br />

(2) the difficulty of sharing what the insurer would have done (creating a field day for expert<br />

witnesses);<br />

(3) the need to maintain strong incentives for proposers to act carefully.<br />

10.18 The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s did not take a view on this, inviting submissions both on the question<br />

whether the law should distinguish between dishonest and negligent misrepresentation/non-disclosure<br />

and whether, for negligent conduct,<br />

―should the law provide a remedy which (unless the parties have agreed otherwise) aims to put<br />

the insurer into the position it would have been had it known the true circumstances?‖ 23<br />

10.19 In the United Kingdom the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s propose to return to business insurance contract<br />

issues late in 2011. The signs are that if the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s recommend anything at all, the changes<br />

proposed will be default rules that can be avoided by agreement, subject to the possibility that some small<br />

businesses, who do not arrange insurance through a broker, may be treated as if they were a consumer<br />

proposer. The <strong>Commission</strong> think that this is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the 2007<br />

Consultation Paper.<br />

10.20 The <strong>Commission</strong> concludes that the law should continue to distinguish between dishonest and<br />

negligent conduct and that dishonesty should continue to allow the insurer to refuse to meet the claim and<br />

retain the premiums. In cases of negligence the position to be adopted should be based upon what the<br />

insurer would have done had the misrepresentation not been made. The <strong>Commission</strong> conclude that this<br />

will provide the insurer with a remedy in damages in accordance with the principle that the insurer is to be<br />

put in the position the insurer would have been in had the insurer known the true circumstances: in cases<br />

of non-disclosure where the proposer negligently breaches the reformulated duty of disclosure, and in<br />

22<br />

23<br />

Consultation Paper, para. 5.88. Soyer, in ―Are the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s on the Right Track?‖ [2008] JBL 385 and<br />

―<strong>Reform</strong>ing Pre-Contractual Information Duties in Business <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Contracts</strong> – One <strong>Reform</strong> Too Many?‖<br />

[2009] JBL 15 argues that the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s restrictions on the availability of avoidance for negligent<br />

breach go too far.<br />

Consultation Paper, para.5.107.<br />

200

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