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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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Further, the assignment of life policies and the existence of the [Traded Endowment Policies<br />

Market] themselves give rise to the same risk of wrongdoing.‖ 85<br />

D<br />

The insurable interest test in Irish <strong>Law</strong><br />

2.52 There is no clear statement from the Irish courts on whether a strict legal interest test is to be<br />

applied or whether a factual expectation test, or some variant thereon, will be enough to satisfy an<br />

insurable interest requirement, when this arises. Macaura was considered in Coen v Employers Liability<br />

<strong>Insurance</strong> Co 86 but no opinion was expressed on the relevant test. The facts of PJ Carrigan Ltd and<br />

Carrigan v Norwich Union Fire Society Ltd 87 closely resemble those contained in Macaura itself, but<br />

Lynch J had no difficulty in finding that because the second plaintiff was the holder of a substantial if not a<br />

beneficial interest in a company that had purchased real property, the second plaintiff had in law an<br />

insurable interest. The factual expectation test is in accordance with recent Irish case law 88 that<br />

recognises legitimate expectation as being an alternative basis for recognising promises as enforceable,<br />

even absent some legal ground for holding the promise to be contractually enforceable.<br />

2.53 There are of course difficulties in using legitimate expectation in this way – an insurance<br />

company is not a public body and it is engaged in commercial, not regulatory activities. But contract law<br />

alone can be adequate. If the contract of insurance was characterised as one in which the insurer has<br />

undertaken to extend cover to a proposer or insured, and the facts reveal that the proposer or insured has<br />

a (legitimate) or factual expectation that the policy will be honoured, it is difficult to see why or how an<br />

insurer should be permitted to resile from the contract. The legitimate or factual expectation should of<br />

course be anchored on some appropriate economic relationship between the proposer or insured and the<br />

subject matter of the insurance contract. Wagering contracts will not suffice; situations where the<br />

proposer or insured has suffered no loss because the property is essentially owned by others will be<br />

outside most insurance contracts, by virtue of the indemnity principle. If an insurer is to insist upon being<br />

able to avoid payment upon a policy because no insurable interest existed at the time of the contract, it<br />

might be appropriate to require the insurer to bargain for such a right in express terms and be under a<br />

duty to seek information from the proposer on the nature of the interest held as a sine qua non to such a<br />

right to resile from a contract. In the absence of such an exchange of information, an insurer should be<br />

regarded as not requiring the proposer to have anything other than a factual expectation in the<br />

transaciton or property in question and that the policy will be honoured by the insurer. As the reasoning<br />

of Wilson J in Constitution <strong>Insurance</strong> Co of Canada v Kosmonpoulos attests, the insurable interest<br />

requirement is a poor means of advancing the deterrence functions against wagering and moral hazard,<br />

while at the same time having the negative effect of frustrating the development of socially desirable<br />

insurance policies, especially in the areas of income protection, elderly and disability maintenance<br />

insurance, and life policies.<br />

2.54 In A Casebook of Irish <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Law</strong>, Corrigan and Campbell observe: 89<br />

―By and large, however, it is rare for insurers to raise the issue of insurable interest to avoid<br />

their contractual obligations. It is primarily a technical requirement and, in the absence of<br />

significant substantive reasons for relying on it as a defence, it is unlikely that an insurer would<br />

obtain a sympathetic hearing and so succeed in invoking it before an Irish court.‖<br />

2.55 Buckley 90 citing Keaton, <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Law</strong>; Basic Text observes that ―it is said that in Macaura the<br />

House of Lords was influenced by unproven allegations of fraud.‖ Ellis and Wiltshire, in Regulation of<br />

85<br />

86<br />

87<br />

88<br />

89<br />

Ibid, p.223.<br />

[1962] IR 314.<br />

High Court, 11 December 1987.<br />

For example, Glencar Exploration plc v Mayo County Council (No2) [2002] 1 IR 84. Promissory estoppel too<br />

may be invoked, but it may be difficult factually to show a representation or reliance in this context: see also<br />

McGrath v Minister for Defence [2010]1 IR 560.<br />

Corrigan and Campbell, A Casebook of Irish <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Law</strong>, p.91. In Carrigan for example the substantive<br />

defence was that the loss occasioned by fire had been caused by arson involving the insured.<br />

43

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