Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission
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―would, in our judgment, on the ordinary meaning of words be inapt to refer to a<br />
misrepresentation which had not been made in fact but was (at most) merely deemed by the<br />
common law to have been made. If it had been the intention of the legislature that a mere<br />
failure to discharge the duty of disclosure in the case of a contract uberrimae fidei would fall to<br />
be treated as the ‗making‘ of a representation within the meaning of the 1967 Act, we are of the<br />
opinion that the legislature would have said so.‖ 27<br />
10.26 Rix LJ in HIH <strong>Insurance</strong> also stated that breach of the duty of good faith leads to only to an<br />
avoidance remedy. 28<br />
(b)<br />
The discretion to award damages in lieu of rescission<br />
10.27 Section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, which was the legislative template for section<br />
45(2) of the Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Act 1980, provides an additional statutory relief by way<br />
of damages following a pre-contractual misrepresentation:<br />
―(2) Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been made to<br />
him otherwise than fraudulently, and he would be entitled, by reason of the misrepresentation,<br />
to rescind the contract, then, if it is claimed in any proceedings arising out of the contract that<br />
the contract ought to be or has been rescinded, the court may declare the contract subsisting<br />
and award damages in lieu of rescission, if of opinion that it would be equitable to do so,<br />
having regard to the nature of the misrepresentation and the loss that would be caused by it if<br />
the contract were upheld, as well as to the loss that rescission would cause to the other party.‖<br />
10.28 Paragraphs in the Tenth Report of the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> Committee 29 explain the thinking that<br />
prompted this legislative change. The <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong> Committee clearly felt that it was necessary to restrict<br />
the representee‘s right to rescind the contract on the basis that damages would be a more proportionate<br />
remedy: after referring to the ―drastic‖ remedy of rescission and proposals in the Report to make this<br />
remedy more widely available than hithertofore, the Committee recommended that damages should be<br />
available to a court as an alternative to rescission:<br />
―Unless the court‘s power to grant rescission is made more elastic than it is at present, the<br />
court will not be able to take account of the relative importance or unimportance of the facts<br />
which have been misrepresented. A car might be returned to the vendor because of a<br />
misrepresentation about the mileage done since the engine was last overhauled, or a transfer<br />
of shares rescinded on account of an incorrect statement about the right to receive the current<br />
dividend. In some cases the result could be as harsh on the representor as the absence of a<br />
right to rescind under the present law can be on the representee.‖ 30<br />
10.29 Section 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 has also been adopted in some Australian<br />
jurisdictions and in Hong Kong. What is surprising about the provision is just how little the provision has<br />
been used by the judiciary. Some of the reasons for this underutilisation may be traced back to the rather<br />
tentative nature of the 1967 reform itself. There is no right to damages in lieu: the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Reform</strong><br />
Committee recommended a judicial discretion be enacted:<br />
―we recommend that wherever the court has power to order rescission it should, as an<br />
alternative, have a discretionary power to award damages if it is satisfied that these would<br />
afford adequate compensation to the plaintiff, having regard to the nature of the representation<br />
and the fact that the injury suffered by the plaintiff is small compared with what rescission<br />
would involve.‖<br />
10.30 Section 2(2) clearly has no application to cases of fraudulent misrepresentation. It is also<br />
arguable that in cases where an insurer is seeking to avoid a contract of insurance for innocent<br />
misrepresentation or non-disclosure, rescission is not the remedy that the insurer seeks to invoke. The<br />
27<br />
28<br />
29<br />
30<br />
[1989] 2 All ER 952 at 1004.<br />
HIH Casualty and General <strong>Insurance</strong> Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2001] 2 Lloyd‘s Rep. 483.<br />
(July 1962). Cmnd. 1872, Innocent Misrepresentation.<br />
Ibid. Paragraph 11.<br />
202