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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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and other points, The Litsion Pride was overruled in The Star Sea. 16 In Canada it has been held that the<br />

concept of utmost good faith ―plays no part when it comes to an allegation of fraud in the proof of loss‖:<br />

Tumbles Video Ltd v INA <strong>Insurance</strong> Co of Canada. 17 It is certainly arguable that enthusiasts for a general<br />

post contractual duty require section 17 of the Marine <strong>Insurance</strong> Act 1906 to carry more weight than it can<br />

realistically sustain.<br />

8.08 Critics of a post contractual duty of good faith point to not only the inherent vagueness of the<br />

duty and the fact that the remedy of avoidance found in section 17 is inappropriate. Lord Hobhouse, in<br />

The Star Sea said that, apart from some reinsurance situations ―it is hard to think of circumstances where<br />

an assured will stand to benefit from the avoidance of the policy for something that has occurred after the<br />

contract has been entered into.‖ 18<br />

8.09 There are good policy reasons why the duty of pre-contractual good faith on both sides – ie the<br />

duty to make disclosure and not to misrepresent matters of fact – should be supported. It is generally<br />

cheaper and easier for proposers to disclose what they already know, or may be able to readily discover<br />

(be the most effective source of information in other words) than for an insurer to have to investigate<br />

circumstances and phycical and other conditions, perhaps at some remote place. Nevertheless, there<br />

are equally valid reasons why it may be appropriate for the insurer to separately evaluate ―the risk‖, (eg<br />

examine a site or locality for the purposes of property insurance), failure to do so constituting a waiver of<br />

the duty of disclosure. The insurer will be in the best position to assess risk when the proposer has no<br />

special knowledge or no appreciation of the risk. The <strong>Commission</strong> believe that the provisional<br />

recommendations made on recasting the duty of disclosure to a redacted duty that genuinely depends on<br />

disparity of information will more appropriately reflect the spirit of Lord Mansfield‘s views in Carter v<br />

Boehm. Rose provides three interesting explanations for the exceptional nature of the utmost good faith<br />

obligation in insurance law, isolated as it generally is in the common law:<br />

―The first is formal. Simply, the pre-contractual duty of disclosure is established by judicial and<br />

statutory authority so cannot be overcome without legislative intervention, until which time it<br />

remains as a base for potential expansion. A second possibility is psychological. The duty of<br />

disclosure is commonly articulated superlatively within a more grandly expressed idea – utmost<br />

good faith – and it is also expressed in terms of an ancient and dignified language (uberrima<br />

fides or uberrimae fidei) – as indeed is the best known emanation of the contrary general<br />

principle (caveat emptor). This both enhances its apparent authority and seems to have<br />

encouraged an indiscriminate and symbiotic association between different expressions of good<br />

faith and duties to disclose. Thirdly, there has been habitual conditioning…judiciary seems to<br />

have accepted that constant reference to post-contractual duties of good faith and disclosure –<br />

often unaccompanied, indeed perhaps because unaccompanied, by specific illustrations of<br />

their practical application – has given them some form of validity which may now need to be<br />

removed rather than simply denied. The law has been allowed to appear more complicated<br />

than it really is, and to be given support for becoming so.‖ 19<br />

8.10 The concept of uberrimae fides or uberrimae fidei itself has not been universally acclaimed as<br />

an essential part of insurance law. In South Africa the Court of Appeal, in Mutual and Federal <strong>Insurance</strong><br />

Co Ltd v Oudtshoorn 20 saw no real role for utmost good faith in Roman Dutch <strong>Law</strong>.<br />

14<br />

15<br />

16<br />

17<br />

18<br />

19<br />

20<br />

Leon v Casey [1932] 2 KB 576 and China Traders Ins Co Ltd v Royal Enchange Assurance Corp [1898] 2 QB<br />

187; Boulton v Holder Bros & Co [1904] 1 KB 784; Harding v Bussell [1905] 2 KB 83.<br />

Britton v Royal Ins Co (1866) 4 F&F 905, 909.<br />

[2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469.<br />

[1992] 2 WWR 66: Saskachewan Crop <strong>Insurance</strong> Crop v Deck [2008] 8 WWR 501.<br />

[2001] UKHL 1, [2003] 1 AC 469, at para. 57.<br />

[2007] LMCLQ 181, at 195.<br />

1985 1 SA 419; Joubert JA said that utmost good faith was unknown to Roman law. For a discussion on<br />

PEICL and the duty of disclosure in Dutch law see Delfos-Roy (2011) 19 ERPL 71.<br />

165

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