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Insurance Contracts CP - Law Reform Commission

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non-disclosure or misrepresentation to defeat a claim successfully, rather than raise the<br />

seemingly more complicated issue of fraud. Those cases that to exist have arisen in the<br />

claims context and are all of very recent origin. Historically Irish insurers have relied on indirect<br />

and unrelated defences to avoid paying what they believed to be a fraudulent claim. With<br />

many of these defences no longer available, insurers nofaced by what they believe to be a<br />

fraudulent claim are forced to confront head-on the issue of fraud. 56<br />

4.50 Both Lord Hershell‘s speech and the extract from MacGillivray were applied in McAleenan v<br />

AIG (Europe) Ltd. 57 The plaintiff was employed as a solicitor in the practice of Michael Lynn & Co. Mr<br />

Lynn was the principal and in preparing an application for professional indemnity cover Mr Lynn stated on<br />

the proposal form that the plaintiff was a partner in the firm. After holding that this was both untrue and a<br />

material misstatement, Finlay Geoghegan J went on to consider whether the misstatement was fraudulent<br />

in the light of two further findings, (1) that the plaintiff did not know of Mr Lynn‘s misstatement, (2) she<br />

signed the form on behalf of the practice, in Mr Lynn‘s absence from his office. Finlay Geoghegan J<br />

continued:<br />

―Neither of the above findings precluded a finding of fraud in the making of the false statement<br />

if the untrue statement was made ―recklessly‖, in the sense that the term was used in Derry v<br />

Peek, ie careless as to whether the statement be true of false. It is clear that ―careless‖ for this<br />

purpose is not the same as when used in relation to the tort of negligence. The carelessness<br />

must be something greater, if it is to constitute recklessness for the purposes of fraud. As<br />

pointed out by Lord Herschell, in the extract from his speech referred to above, a statement<br />

may be considered as made recklessly where the circumstances are such that the Court<br />

considers that the maker can have no real belief in the truth of what he states. It appears to<br />

require an objective consideration by the Court as to whether the circumstances in which the<br />

plaintiff signed the Proposal Form (and, by doing so, made the representations or statements<br />

contained therein) were so careless as to whether the statements were true or false that the<br />

Court must conclude that she could have had no real belief in the truth of the statements<br />

contained in the Proposal Form….On her own evidence, notwithstanding that the Form, when<br />

presented to her for signature, had been completed, she did not read the answers given in<br />

relation to her status in the practice and was unaware of the type of person by whom the Form<br />

was required to be completed and signed, notwithstanding the express statement at the start of<br />

the Form and the description immediately under which she signed. As already stated her<br />

actions must be considered in the context of the obligations of ‗utmost good faith‘ in relation to<br />

the completion of a proposal form for insurance of which she was or ought to have been aware.<br />

Considering the matter from the plaintiff‘s potential belief in the truth of the statements made in<br />

the competed Proposal Form, as on her own evidence, she was unaware of what statements<br />

she was making by signing the Form, - and was unaware of the person expressly required to<br />

sign the Form. It is not possible for me to conclude that she had any belief in the truth of the<br />

statements made.‖ 58<br />

4.51 Irish case-law on fraudulent misrepresentation does not suggest that the law contains any<br />

critical problems generally. The question whether fraud raises any particular difficulties in terms of<br />

consumer confusion in particular was considered by the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s in the 2007 Joint Consultation<br />

Paper and again in the 2009 Report and Draft Bill. The proposals on avoidance for fraud generally follow<br />

common law patterns. Indeed, while the Consumer <strong>Insurance</strong> (Disclosure and Representations) Bill 2011<br />

56<br />

57<br />

58<br />

Corrigan & Campbell, A Casebook of Irish <strong>Insurance</strong> <strong>Law</strong> (Oak Tree Press 1994) at 322<br />

[2010] IEHC 128. See also Goldsmith Williams v Travellers <strong>Insurance</strong> [2010] Lloyd‘s <strong>Law</strong> Reports IR 309.<br />

[2010] IEHC 128, at paras 123-4. Contrast Odyssey Cinemas Ltd v Village Theatres Three Ltd [2010] NICh 1,<br />

[2010] NICA 25, above, on the negligence/recklessness boundary. Furay v Eagle Star and British Dominions<br />

<strong>Insurance</strong> (1922) 56 ILTR 23, 109.<br />

104

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