the development of russian military policy and finland

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Geopolitical Changes in Europe 9 has sent a clear signal to Moscow [at the beginning of the second term of the Obama Administration] that the post-Soviet space is not included in the main priorities of U.S. foreign policy”. 28 This would give Russia freedom of action. The intergovernmental military alliance CSTO was agreed upon on 15 May 1992 and the Charter of CSTO entered into force on 18 September 2003. 29 At the CSCE summit meeting held in Budapest in December 1994, a clear change in direction could be noted. “Europe may be forced into a Cold Peace”, President Boris Yeltsin, warned. 30 After this, Russia’s liberal political leadership was gradually forced to step aside. In January of 1996, Yevgeni Primakov, a high-ranking officer in the former KGB and the head of the foreign intelligence service SVR, replaced Mr. Kozyrev. Political power in Russia and the responsibility for threat assessments and situational awareness shifted increasingly into the hands of conservatives who were close to the country’s security agencies and military authorities. The development sketched out in Andrei Kozyrev’s “joking speech” of 1992 was conclusively realized after the war in Georgia, when President Medvedev 28 Руська Правда, 19 January 2013, США и Россия разграничат «сферы влияния» (Александров, Михаил (Aleksandrov, Mikhail)) [http://ruska-pravda.org/monitoringsmi/38-st-monitoring-smi/19724--l-r.html]. Dr. Mikhail Alexandrov, Department head at the CIS Baltic Institute, writes in Ruska Pravda: “Washington actually offers Moscow exchange: to agree to the consolidation of the post-Soviet Russia's sphere of influence in return for non-interference in other regions of the world, which are vitally important to U.S. interests.” See also RIA Novosti, 30 January 2013, “Russia, Kazakhstan Sign Air Defence Agreement” [http://en.rian.ru/world/20130130/179120146/Russia-Kazakhstan-Sign-Air-Defen-se- Agreement.html]; RIA Novosti, 31.01.2013, “Russia, Armenia Agree to Set up Joint Defence Enterprises” [http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130131/17913 8896/Russia-Armenia- Agree-to-Set-up-Joint-Defense-Enterprises.html]. In late January 2013 Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement to create a joint regional air defence system and Russia and Armenia agreed on defence co-operation, including building joint defence enterprises and maintenance centres for military equipment. 29 Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности (OДКБ) − Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Basic facts [http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_ aengl.htm, accessed 29 January 2013]. The Secretary-General of CSTO, Col.Gen. Nikolay Bordyuzha was appointed in 2003. His background includes service in the Strategic Rocket Forces, the KGB, the Federal Border Service, and the Presidential Administration. See more VIPERSON.RU, 2013, “Бордюжа, Николай Николаевич” [http://viperson.ru/wind.php?ID=1487, accessed 29 January 2013]. 30 The disappointing Budapest CSCE summit was a disaster, according to Newsweek Magazine. Russia opposed NATO enlargement and especially the proposals for statements concerning Serbia and the war in Bosnia. Newsweek: “a red-faced Yeltsin admonishing a stunned Bill Clinton that ‘the destinies . . . of the world community [cannot] be managed from a single capital [i.e., Washington].’ ” See Newsweek, 19 December 1994, “Plunging into a Cold Peace” [http://www.newsweek.com/1994/12/18/plunging-into-a-coldpeace.html]. After this “Cold Peace” as a concept has remained doggedly in the vocabulary of international politics. See Beste, Klussmann & Steingart, 2008.
10 · The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland presented the main principles of Russian foreign and defence policy in August of 2008. Special attention was given to the following passage: Protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us. 31 These principles were finally written into law at the end of 2009, giving Russia’s armed forces the right to operate abroad. 32 With regard to Russia’s relations to foreign countries, Medvedev affirmed that “there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are situated in countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors.” 33 In September of 2008, Medvedev told political analysts from the Western countries that: “Our neighbors are close to us in many respects, and are a traditional area of interest for the Russian nation. We are so close to each other, it would be impossible to tear us apart, to say that Russia has to embark on one path and our neighbors on another.” 34 Thus Russia also strives to strengthen the loyalty of Russians living outside her borders to their Motherland, and may also use harsh methods to achieve her goals. In this sense, problems have come up, especially in certain Baltic States in that preserving Russian citizenship is more important to a large number of Baltic Russians than the citizenship to their actual homeland. One may consider secondary citizenship to also include certain obligations to the country one is a citizen of. Problems of conflicting loyalties may arise from this in times of crisis and not only in the Baltic States. Finland is also a target of Russia’s persistent efforts to increase her influence using “soft power”. Under the pretext of protecting the rights of Russians living in Finland, Russian authorities have meddled in the affairs of private citizens and tried to elevate these issues to a national level. In a particular case concerning child-care, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov went as far as to condemn Finland of “uncivilized” treatment of a Russian national. 35 31 President of Russia, 2008. 32 Matthews & Nemtsova, 2009; People’s Daily Online, 9 November 2009, “Medvedev Signs Use of Russian Army Abroad into Law” [http://english.people.com.cn/90001/ 90777/90851/6808120.html]. 33 President of Russia, 2008. 34 Debski, 2008. 35 Voice of Russia, 8 October 2012, “Russian Foreign Chief Slams Finland for Separating Mother and New-Born Baby” [http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_10_08/Russian-foreign-chief-
Page 1 and 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY
Page 3 and 4: Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Per
Page 6 and 7: CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i 1 INTR
Page 8 and 9: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The powerful revi
Page 10 and 11: The current ground forces east and
Page 12: v Comparisons in which Finland’s
Page 15 and 16: 2 · The Development of Russian Mil
Page 21: 8 · The Development of Russian Mil
Page 25 and 26: 12 · The Development of Russian Mi
Page 73 and 74:
60 · The Development of Russian Mi
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
100 · The Development of Russian M
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133 and 134:
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
132 The Development of Russian Mil
Page 147 and 148:
134 The Development of Russian Mil
Page 149 and 150:
Previously published in this series
Page 151 and 152:
No 25, 2004 Joonas Sipilä, Erko Mi
Page 153 and 154:
Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskork
show all

the development of russian military policy and finland

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?