the development of russian military policy and finland

Characteristics of Russia’s Use of Force · 43
assault described above, became public in June 2012. 169 Evaluation of these
plans became possible by analyzing very detailed military maps from 1989,
made and successively updated by the Soviet Army General Staff.
The Finnish interpretation of what Soviet Cold War contingency planning
would have meant, if operations had been executed, can be summarized as
follows: Central functions of the Finnish society were to be paralyzed, radio
and TV stations knocked out, the Parliament, the Presidential palace and military
command centres were to be seized rapidly. Road junctions, harbours,
bus depots, railway and metro stations were to be captured, financial institutions,
water supply and district heating shut down. The aggressor would strive
to defeat any organized military resistance by a steady supply of airborne reinforcements
as well as by forces landing from the sea. The general population’s
will to resist was expected to break down in a few days as hunger and thirst
take command. The whole Finnish capital and its surroundings would be occupied
and sealed off in a matter of a few days.
An interesting present day comparison is offered by the prestigious Russian
Valdai Discussion Club:
Military operations are designed to not only defeat the enemy physically, but also to
crush their morale, and not just of the troops but also of the people and the government.
Factors such as the depth of support for the war among the general population
play an increasingly important role and, accordingly, so does understanding and using
culturally specific features of the enemy and his political system, including through exposure
via the media.
[...]
The distinction between “civilian” and “military” segments of society is disappearing.
The aim of a military campaign is to impact not only the enemy army, but also its society,
understood in terms of its cultural as well as its physical aspects. This trend
makes it necessary to conduct joint “civilian-military” operations, rather than purely
military ones. 170
If Russia’s decision to extend her operations to enemy territory was made one
month before execution, some brigades may be ready for deployment. If the
decision is made, say, six months in advance, an additional force, roughly 20-
30 brigades, could be ready for deployment. Forces available for deployment
could be even more, if they are not bound to other directions. Concealment
169 Salonen, 2012. The existence of these valuable maps in Estonia became known at the
time of the Soviet withdrawal from Estonia. Their destruction was averted and Finnish
military historian Antero Uitto was later able to acquire them. It is interesting that the Soviet
Union placed Finland squarely in the enemy camp, regardless of the FCMA Treaty
between the countries, the cornerstone on which Finnish and Russian official political relations
were built.
170 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 8.