the development of russian military policy and finland

5
CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIA’S USE OF FORCE
R
ussia’s operational plans are naturally secret, but by analysing the background
and decisions regarding defence policy, deployments of armed
forces units, military exercises and literature, one can present some
estimates. As outlined earlier and based upon her strategic decisions, Russia is
developing those of her armed forces that are in their own garrisons capable
for immediate action in different directions. According to the country’s traditional
military thinking, the aim is to keep warfare outside the homeland territory.
In dimensioning the capacity of her own armed forces facing west, Russia
assesses the capabilities of the United States and NATO.
In Russian thinking, high combat readiness of forces is nothing new. For example,
Soviet forces in East Germany were ready to start “defence battle” by
immediate attack. This was told by Colonel General Matvei Burlakov (the
former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces in East Germany) in
2005. 165
A high state of readiness is an exceptionally great advantage in offensive operations,
especially if the troops can be ordered into action directly from basic
readiness. The possibility for successful surprise to the detriment of the adversary
is then most favourable, since the enemy’s intelligence has not been able
to detect anything very alarming, but mainly contradictory signals or signals
difficult to interpret. It seems improbable that governments would make difficult
and costly decisions for mobilization on such shaky grounds. Thus Russia’s
striving to reach a high degree of basic readiness is logical defence planning.
After reaching such high readiness capability, the Russian armed forces’
ability to achieve their military objectives even with limited resources must be
deemed as being good.
For the time being Russia seems only to have embarked on the road to such
higher readiness. Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, commander of the
airborne forces suggested in 2009 that:
It makes sense to move to a three-way troop training system. While one battalion is
sending people on leave, the second is at some distant range, the third will be carrying
out combat training at its place of deployment. … It is on combat duty. The events in
165 Kalashnikova, 2005. An English version, “All They Had to Do Was Give the Signal” is
found at [http://www.kommersant.com/ page.asp?id=558042].