the development of russian military policy and finland

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Development of Russia’s Military Potential · 39 using the experience accumulated, our specialists developed the T-34 - the best tank in World War II. [...] In the coming decade the troops will take delivery of more than 400 modern groundand sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles, eight strategic missile submarines, around 20 multi-role submarines, more than 50 surface warships, around 100 military satellites, more than 600 modern aircraft, including fifth-generation fighters, more than 1 000 helicopters, 28 S-400 regiment-level surface-to-air missile systems, 38 Vityaz division-level surface-to-air missile systems, ten brigade-level Iskander-M systems, more than 2 300 modern tanks, around 2 000 self-propelled artillery systems and cannon, and also more than 17 000 military vehicles. [...] The updating of the defense industry complex will be the locomotive that will pull the development of the most diverse sectors in its wake. 159 The outcome of the rearmament program remains to be seen. 160 Some Western experts point out that “the currently envisaged plans for military expenditure do not seem to be sustainable, even if the economic situation does not deteriorate”. 161 Interestingly enough, the high command of the Swedish Defence Forces, stated clearly in January 2013, that Russia’s “modernisation of her defence equipment is proceeding well”. 162 Pushing the programme through with great determination may be possible, but it could be accomplished only by diverting funds from social programs, which could trigger unpopular reactions and social unrest. On the other hand Russia’s increasing defence export should be mentioned. Annual revenue during 2011−2012 alone is exceeding 10 billion euro. 163 The Director of the U.S. National Intelligence, Lt.Gen. James R. Clapper gave the following assessment of Russia’s military capabilities in January 2012: Moscow is now setting its sights on long-term challenges of rearmament and professionalization. In 2010, Medvedev and Putin approved a 10-year procurement plan to replace 159 Putin, 2012. 160 It is likely, that the next refinement of the State rearmament program will take place at about 2015, when GPV-2025 would be announced. Long-term programs with a timespan of ten years very seldom materialize as such anywhere in the world. 161 Cooper, 2012a. 162 Försvarsmakten kommenterar (The Defence Forces comments), 14 January 2013, Försvarsmaktens anförande i Sälen 2013: Kartan och verkligheten (The Defence force’s presentation in Sälen 2013: The map vs. reality, Peter Sandwall) [http://blogg. forsvarsmakten.se/kommentar/2013/01/14/forsvarsmaktens-anforande-i-salen-2013/]. The speech at the annual Swedish national security conference Folk och Försvar (Society & Defence) was to be delivered by Supreme Commander, General Sverker Göranson, but due to acute illness he was replaced with the Director General of the Swedish Defence Forces, Mr. Peter Sandwall. 163 Cooper, 2012a.
40 · The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland Soviet-era hardware and bolster deterrence with a balanced set of modern conventional, asymmetric, and nuclear capabilities. However, funding, bureaucratic, and cultural hurdles—coupled with the challenge of reinvigorating a military industrial base that deteriorated for more than a decade after the Soviet collapse—will complicate Russian efforts. [...] The reform and modernization programs will yield improvements that will allow the Russian military to more rapidly defeat its smaller neighbors and remain the dominant military force in the post-Soviet space, but will not—and are not intended to—enable Moscow to conduct sustained offensive operations against NATO collectively. In addition, the steep decline in conventional capabilities since the collapse of the Soviet Union has compelled Moscow to invest significant capital to modernize its conventional forces. At least until Russia’s high precision conventional arms achieve practical operational utility, Moscow will embrace nuclear deterrence as the focal point of its defense planning, and it still views its nuclear forces as critical for ensuring Russian sovereignty and relevance on the world stage, and for offsetting its military weaknesses vis-à-vis potential opponents with stronger militaries. 164 164 Clapper, 31 January 2012.
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Previously published in this series
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No 25, 2004 Joonas Sipilä, Erko Mi
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Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskork
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