the development of russian military policy and finland

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Characteristics of Russia’s Use of Force · 45 control of logistics, highways, railroads and sea transport is significant in this respect. 175 Russia’s declaration of new limitations for foreigners, dealing with the purchase of property in land near borders 176 , may also stem from security policy. For the sake of military security, Russia may not want possible foreign observation posts in areas, whose owners’ rights and potential activities even the officials may have a responsibility to protect. During the war in Georgia in August of 2008, Russia showed in practice how far she is ready to go, if she feels that a small neighbouring country threatens her national interests. 177 President Putin confirmed in August 2012, that the invasion of Georgia was pre-planned. 178 Russia’s concern over the Baltic States’ membership in NATO has already been mentioned. Colonel Ari Puheloinen made a thorough research of Russia’s geopolitical objectives in the Baltic Sea area at the end of the 1990s. One scenario, “The Rise of Russia,” closely reminds one of recent developments. 179 However, if Russia should decide to take action against the Baltic countries, the Finnish Defence Forces would probably be tied up, in order to prevent Finland from becoming a flank threat. The means of such actions could be threatening, various kinds of precision attacks, or even invasion. 180 175 See cf. Chekinov and Bogdanov, 2010, p. 8 176 Finland lost about 10 percent of its territory and property to the Soviet Union in 1940 and 1944. Many Finns would want to buy back their former land property, build Summer houses etc. This has proved to be very difficult and Russia applies a far more restrictive policy towards Finns than the Finnish Government towards Russians buying property in Finland. 177 Agrell, 2010, p. 235 (in Swedish). Professor Wilhelm Agrell, well-known Swedish peace and conflict researcher, is of the same opinion as Russia, but with opposite arguments, that the credibility of the European security regime collapsed in the war in Georgia, at the latest. 178 Студия “Альфа”, г. Тверь, 7 August 2012, “Потерянный день" вся правда о Войне 08.08.08г.” (The Lost Day, the Whole Truth about the War 8 August 2008) [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYQeeFXhOQw]; Ennis, 2012; RIA Novosti, 8 August 2012, “Former Generals Slate Medvedev Over Ossetia War” [http://en.rian.ru/world/ 20120808/175066806.html]; AFP (Yahoo News), 8 August 2012, “Russia Prepared for Georgia War, Trained ‘Militiamen’: Putin” [http://news. yahoo.com/russia-prepared-georgia-war-trained-militiamen-putin-200115109.html]. See also Felgenhauer, 2012. 179 Puheloinen, 1999, pp. 50–51. 180 When the Red Army executed its grand strategic assault in the Baltics in late summer 1944, the Soviet Union tied up the Finnish forces, which still held a considerable strike capability, at Ilomantsi in eastern Finland. The loss of two Red Army divisions was the price the Soviet Union was then ready to pay in order to avert the flank threat.
46 · The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland 5.2 Basic Readiness and Its Enhancement The number of Russian forces in the former Leningrad Military District has changed significantly after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The units withdrawn from East Germany were first concentrated there. Then followed a huge reduction of troops. Now the trend has again been reversed. The headquarters of the 6 th Russian Army was stationed in Petrozavodsk. It is now located near Kasimovo, the “military village” built by the Finns for Russian helicopter units north of St. Petersburg. The headquarters appears to be in charge of the ground forces east and south-east of Finland. A new motorized infantry brigade was re-established in 2010 in Vladimirsky Lager south of St. Petersburg. It may still be deficient but is likely to belong to the planned units of high readiness. In Kamenka, on the Karelian Isthmus there is an elite motorized infantry brigade. From the weapons depot at Sertolovo, north of St. Petersburg, it is possible to establish a reserve brigade. A helicopter unit in support of these brigades is also stationed on the Isthmus. Furthermore there is an abundance of artillery units in the area, supporting these brigades, including a heavy rocket launcher brigade (Tver) with a range of 80 kilometres. In addition an operational brigade belonging to the Ministry of the Interior is located in Lebyazhie (Лебяжье, Lepäsi). A particularly significant addition of military potential is the deployment of the new ballistic missile system Iskander-M, with a missile brigade in Luga, south of St. Petersburg. The maximum range of the missile is officially 450 kilometres but may reach 700 kilometres, depending of the weight of the warhead. 181 Professor Stephen J. Blank (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute) underlines that it is no longer political rhetoric, but actual policy when Iskander-missiles are deployed in the neighbourhood of Finland: 181 Forss, 2012. See also STRATFOR, 30 November 2010, “Russian Missiles on NATO’s Border.” The first Iskander missiles (one battalion) arrived at the 26 th Artillery and Missile Brigade in Luga in the spring of 2010 and were declared operational in mid-December 2010. See also RIA Novosti, 14 December 2010, “Western Military District Gets First Iskander Tactical Missile System” [http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20101214/161766995. html]. The brigade was fully equipped with Iskander missiles in mid-2011 and is now combat ready; Russia Today, 20 October 20011, “In a Nod to European Missile Defence, Russia Rolls Out the Iskander Missile [http://rt.com/politics/russia-missile-defence-nato-europe- 293/]. See also Garavskij, 2011; Isby, 2011. A thorough technical analysis of the missile shows that the maximum range with a 480 kilo warhead is about 700 kilometres and that an upgraded missile using more efficient fuel may reach 1000 kilometres in the future. It is not known that the missile would have been tested at ranges exceeding 500 kilometres, which would mean definite violation of the INF Treaty.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY
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Stefan Forss, Lauri Kiianlinna, Per
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i 1 INTR
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Previously published in this series
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No 25, 2004 Joonas Sipilä, Erko Mi
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Strategian laitos Maanpuolustuskork
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