the development of russian military policy and finland

Development of Russia’s Military Potential · 31
These units are to be ready to execute combat operations within one hour after
receiving orders. 111 In practice, however, it is evident that ‘permanent
readiness’ brigades will not appear as originally planned, to be able to maintain
daily readiness at full strength. Rather there will be combat units of battalion
strength in permanent readiness. 112 Colonel General Valery Gerasimov, successor
to Army General Nikolai Makarov as Chief of the General Staff,
pointed out in January 2013 that “no one rules out the possibility of a major
war, and it cannot be said that we are unprepared”. 113
In 2008, the period of conscript service was reduced from two years to one.
According to announcements made in the spring of 2011, the earlier goal of
over 550 000 draftees annually was reduced to 400 000. 114 The call-up in fall
2011, less than 136 000 men, was not encouraging and this raises doubts as to
the possibilities to reach stated goals. 115 If the modernized armed forces can
pool up 300 000 conscripts annually, a challenging goal, the system will produce
even in the future a reserve of several millions of trained reservists under
the age of 35. A report published by the prestigious Valdai Club in July 2012,
states:
Thus, by the end of 2011 it is assumed that the million-strong army will consist of
220 000 officers, 425 000 contract soldiers, and 350 000 conscripts. The latter figure
is much more realistic compared to the previously planned 700 000. However, it
remains to be seen whether the Defense Ministry will be able to assemble a 400 000-
strong corps of contract personnel. 116
Because of the military organizational changes, the current conscript service
crisis in the Russian Armed Forces and the negative demographic develop-
111 The ambitious aim is to improve combat readiness for the frontline units to just 1−2
hours after given orders. Tikhonov, Aleksandr et. al., 2011; IHS Jane’s World Armies, 15 November
2012, “Russian Federation.” Jane’s World Armies estimated in November 2012 that
the majority of the Airborne Forces can be deployed within 12 hours while the bulk of the
Ground Forces should be operational within 24 to 48 hours, albeit in many cases with
20−40 percent deficit in vehicles. See also Litovkin, 2010 and Estinko, 2010.
112 McDermott, 2012.
113 Litovkin, 2013; RIA Novosti, 26 January 2013, “Russia’s Forces Are Ready for War
– Army Chief” [http://en.rian.ru/mili-tary_news/20130126/179040460/Russias-Forces-
Are-Ready-for-War-Army-Chief.html].
114 Felgenhauer, 2011.
115 Carlsson & Norberg, 2012, pp. 102−03. See also Russian Defence Policy, 6 January
2012, “No One to Call (Part I)” [http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/01/06/noone-to-call-part-i/].
The number of conscripted young men during 2011 was altogether
354,570, according to Russian Ministry of Defence. It is too early to tell if the steep decline
in conscription figures in the fall of 2011 will prove to be permanent. According to official
Russian census figures there should be about two million young men of 18−19 year’s age,
but some 800 000 seem to be able to evade conscription service without legally acceptable
reasons.
116 Barabanov, Makienko & Pukhov, 2012, p. 28