AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING 2009 - ISS

90 MEKALIA PAULOS AKLILU
best and sheer insanity at worst. However, to the extent that it attains a certain
implicit objective, the aforementioned concept is pivotal in benevolently shrouding this
underlying motive.
The history of developed nations irrevocably attests to the fact that
they did not achieve such heights in the manner they faithfully prescribe
to their ill-fated counterparts, a strategy of “kicking away the ladder” as
Chang so poignantly epitomizes (Chang 2002). The rich Western nations
seem to have fashioned “a multilateral order which best suits their current
developmental trajectory – one that diminishes space for promoting
industries critical to [other nations’] climb up the development ladder”
(Weiss 2005: 723). Particularly telling is the fact that South Korea had no
necessity for further capital owing to its phenomenal savings rate, thus
this begs the question why it was pressured by external forces to follow
such a course of action. The accumulation of immense sums of wealth in
the realm of global financiers, a substantial percentage of which resulted
from speculative transactions, would be one indubitable drive.
That there is an enduring liaison between individuals in the US Treasury,
US Federal Reserve, IMF, World Bank and chief Wall Street financiers
is a well-known but not overtly acknowledged phenomenon as influential
forces continue to hold the IMF and World Bank captive to their
agendas (Chossudovsky 2003). With a “one dollar, one vote” rule, the
US has a major say in world financial policies. It is thus prudent to view
the response to the crisis in the larger framework of the crucial position
ideas and ideology (premised on underlying interests) hold in formulating
economic policies. As Beeson and Islam argue, “the contest of ideas in
economic policy-making can evolve independently of their intellectual
merit and empirical credibility” (Beeson and Islam 2005). The excessive
sway the United States held over the IMF and World Bank policy making
apparatus was reflected in the notion that the South Korean economy
was essentially flawed and thus warranted fundamental reform.
There was a severe dearth in a rational, impartial and dispassionate study
in the origins of the crisis. Those that raised objections to the verdict
were expediently discounted (but this begs the question if such institutions
can ever truly be politically neutral as it can be argued legitimizing
certain entrenched interests was the very reason for their inception in the
global sphere). By Stiglitz’s own admission, viewing the IMF recommended
reform process through the prism of accomplishing, first and
foremost, the interests of the financial community would make sense of