AN EXERCISE IN WORLDMAKING 2009 - ISS

7 Does the Aid Consensus Shift from Washington to the South? 73
maps the criticisms that have been expressed on the principle of ownership
in relation to the PRSP process. Fourthly, the theoretical background
of the presumed paradigm shifts after the Washington Consensus
will be examined. The Latent South Consensus described here will
provide a tool to measure alternative policies that indicate the scope for
ownership. The analysis of Rwanda’s EDPRSP 2008-2012 in the fifth
section will reveal the scope for alternative policies reflecting ownership.
The findings will be summarised in the conclusion.
2 CHANGING THE ARCHITECTURE OF AID
After the decolonisation, the first official development aid flowed to the
Global South under the assumption that these countries only suffered an
investment gap, and thus a big push was needed to get them back on
track. Although the “dirigist” local post-colonial development policies
can be commended for some achievements, they were heavily criticised
by the donor community in the 1970s for their weak results (Meyer and
Schulz 2008: 2).
The weak state systems were blamed for their inefficient interventions
in the economy – announcing of the rise of neoliberalism. In the following
decades, the IFIs and the OECD donor countries worked together
towards the downsizing of the development state. Macroeconomic
stability was prioritised as a means for development under the Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAP). In the 1980s, the IFIs coupled this
to the principle of conditionality. That is, a country should comply with
the SAP first before receiving development aid. Conditionalities can be
seen as the first vehicle for improving aid effectiveness, but they came at
a high cost: they were criticised for excluding the (poor) people in developing
countries whose governments did not comply with SAPs.
As history shows, the SAPs did not bring about miracles either. The
assumed relationship between macroeconomic stability, liberalisation and
growth proved to be weak in practice. Many developing countries endured
growing poverty, inequality and debt (McKinley 2008: 93). The
IFIs were criticised for the failure of their policy prescriptions.
The New Aid Architecture
In the 1990s the IFIs were seen as the bloodletting doctors of the 19th
century, whose prescriptions only make the patient weaker. The aid fa-